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Abstract. Research on tax compliance has shown that nonpecuniary incentives
are very important for explaining tax compliance, and may outweigh the impor-
tance of enforcing tax payments with deterring instruments. This thesis seeks to
deepen the understanding of why and how taxpayers respond to nonpecuniary
incentives to comply with the tax code. In particular, this thesis examines the
importance of framing, reputational concerns, and the interplay of trust in author-
ities and deterrence exerted by the state. The second central research objective
in this thesis is to explore the societal determinants and characteristics of trust in
government. This dissertations shows that the objective trustworthiness of insti-
tutions does not necessarily coincide with the subjective trust people put in them.
However, even with lacking accountability and reliability of institutions, this thesis
suggests positive direct links between trust in government and countries’ economic
development.
Keywords: behavioral tax compliance, trust in government, institutions
Kurzfassung. Nicht-moneta¨re Anreize haben einen großen Einfluss auf die Ent-
scheidung zur Steuerehrlichkeit; sie sind so stark, dass sie die Bedeutung von In-
strumenten zur Erzwingung von Steuerzahlungen u¨berwiegen ko¨nnen. Die vor-
liegende Dissertation hat zum Ziel, das Versta¨ndnis u¨ber die Wirkweise dieser
Anreize zu vertiefen. Im Besonderen untersucht sie den Einfluss von Framing,
Sorgen um die eigene Reputation sowie das Zusammenspiel von Vertrauen in
o¨ffentliche Institutionen und der Abschreckung, die durch den Staat betrieben
wird. Das zweite zentrale Forschungsziel dieser Arbeit ist die Analyse der Deter-
minanten und Charakteristika von Vertrauen in die Regierung. Die vorliegende
Dissertation zeigt, dass die objektive Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit von Institutionen und
das subjektive Vertrauen in die Regierung nicht notwendigerweise u¨bereinstim-
men. Außerdem wird aufgezeigt, dass umfassendes Vertrauen trotz unverla¨sslicher
Institutionen positiv mit Wirtschaftswachstum in Verbindung steht.
Schlagwo¨rter: Steuerehrlichkeit, Vertrauen in die Regierung, Institutionen
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Chapter 1
Preface
1.1 Introduction to the topic
Taxes are an essential part of fiscal policies, and primarily in developed economies
they are the most important source of government revenue. Taxes are spent
for the provision of public goods and services such as national security, public
administration, the judicial system and infrastructure projects, but also for the
public provision of private goods, for example health and education. Thus, high
tax revenues and fiscal capacity finance and maintain institutions, and histori-
cally coincide with the development of democratic and pluralistic states of law.
Institutions are vital not only for levying and collecting taxes, but also for al-
locating and (re-)distributing them. Countries which are able to tax at higher
rates and can rely on a broader tax base are typically more prosperous and rich in
both economic and social terms (Besley and Persson, 2013; Bird and Zolt, 2008;
Martinez-Vazquez and Bird, 2014). By now, high-quality institutions are widely
regarded as a (if not the) decisive element for economic and social development
and used as a major explanation why some nations progressed and others did
not, despite richness in, for example, natural resources and land (Acemoglu et al.,
2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Bosworth and Collins, 2003; Dowrick and
Golley, 2004; Rodrik et al., 2004; Fata´s and Mihov, 2013; Easterly and Levine,
2016).
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The nature of taxation is that no individual or even group-specific attributable
benefits are received from its use. Despite the irrefutable importance and use-
fulness of taxes, there is a strong incentive to free-ride: not complying means a
financial benefit without having to forgo the use of goods and services provided
by the government. For single free-riders, the marginal loss for the government
budget and society is negligible, but becomes problematic when non-compliance
grows into a social phenomenon. The remaining honest and cooperative taxpayers
have to bear the extra burden; this dynamic creates an additional incentive not
to pay as well, and is ultimately detrimental to a country’s fiscal capacity and
economic development.
Naturally, it is in the interest of state and society alike to curb such self-interest.
The neoclassic approach towards tax compliance is to reduce the expected utility
from evading below the utility derived from complying with the use of deterring
instruments. Authorities audit taxpayers and punish detected evaders with fines
or imprisonment. For economic agents, taking the risk of non-compliance becomes
less worthwhile the more rigorous deterrence is (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972;
Yitzhaki, 1974; Becker, 1968).
Since audit frequencies exerted by the authorities and penalties inflicted on tax
evasion are relatively lenient, researchers quickly began to wonder why taxpayers
were predominantly compliant.1 Scholars found psychological and sociological fac-
tors to be an important piece in this so-called tax compliance puzzle. Besides the
misperception of (small) probabilities and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Alm et al., 1999), behavioral triggers often evolve around moral or social
norms, reputational concerns, and the aptness to fall for framing.
1See, for example, Andreoni et al. (1998) and Sandmo (2005) for literature reviews. Alm et al.
(1992), with an experiment, came to the conclusion that relative risk aversion would have to be
extraordinarily high to explain actual tax compliance given the (lack of) deterrence. Since tax
evasion is deliberately concealed behavior, reliable estimates on the extent of non-compliance
are hard to get. Feinstein (1991) analyzed the taxpayer compliance measurement program
(TCMP) in the USA and estimated an income tax gap of 84 bn US-Dollars in 1987. Andreoni
et al. (1998) estimated a tax gap of 17.3% in the USA on the federal level and claim that 40%
of individual taxpayers underreported some of their taxable income. Cebula and Feige (2012)
estimate underreporting of 18%-23% of taxable income for the USA, while the HM Revenue
& Customs (2018) reports a gap of 5.7% of all tax liabilities for the UK in 2016-2017. CASE
(2013) estimates VAT gaps for EU countries and finds marked variation across countries and
time.
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The concept of tax morale, defined by Luttmer and Singhal (2014) as “nonpe-
cuniary motivations for tax compliance as well as factors that fall outside the
standard, expected utility framework” (p. 250), has received extensive attention
in recent years. Factors and motivations include reciprocal attitudes and behav-
ior of others and institutions, adherence to established social norms, and a simple
intrinsic incentive to comply based on a personal, moral framework. Tax morale
depends on a wide array of determinants, including, among others, patriotism and
religiosity, trust in, and the quality of, institutions and the perceived inequality in
society (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Feld and Frey, 2002; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014;
Torgler, 2003, 2006).
Besley and Persson (2014) describe tax morale as a tipping point towards tax
compliance in the complementary relationship with authorities’ deterrence efforts,
which is very sensitive to the relationship between the state (that collects taxes
and reallocates them) and the citizens (who pay taxes and are at the receiving
end of government expenses). However, even in direct democracies, taxpayers have
only limited control and influence over the government’s actions and use of the
budget. If taxpayer-money is systematically wasted, if officials are corrupt and
serve special interest groups rather than the common good, voters’ preferences
are ignored, or the government even pursues warmongering ways, non-compliance
might be seen as a morally justifiable, even mandatory response (Cowell, 1990;
McGee, 2012a, 2012b).
In a nutshell, taxes are (or, as a normative statement, should be) paid if authori-
ties behave in a way that citizens/taxpayers feel confident to trust them. Kirchler
(2007), reviewing decades of research on tax compliance from the perspective of
tax psychology, regards trust in authorities as a “critical factor in understand-
ing the origins of civic engagement [and] cooperation with authorities” (p. 202)
and sees it as efficiency-increasing, since a trusted government would not need
to consistently justify and explain decisions. Picked up in the tipping point de-
scribed above, trust in government is complemented by authorities’ deterrence
efforts in a reciprocal relationship. The perception of power of authorities de-
pends on how trustworthy a government acts. Pursuing either strategy can result
in a high-compliance equilibrium, but the emerging societal climate can either be
3
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“synergistic” (trust predominates) or “antagonistic” (trust is low and taxpayers
seek to escape coercive deterrence). In the former environment taxes are paid
voluntarily, while tax compliance is enforced in the latter.
1.2 Structure and research objectives
This thesis consists of three further chapters which contribute to two main re-
search objectives. The first objective is to deepen the understanding of why and
how taxpayers respond to nonpecuniary incentives to comply with the tax code.
Chapter 2 examines the reciprocal relationship between trust in authorities and
power of authorities (first formulated by Kirchler (2007)) and its repercussions for
tax compliance from an aggregate, societal perspective – thus, it explores the tip-
ping point of tax compliance. Chapter 2 is the first study that transfers and tests
the tax-psychological Slippery Slope Framework (Kirchler et al., 2008) in the con-
text of a “behavioral public finance” approach (see McCaffery and Slemrod (2016)
for a review). Chapter 2 also introduces novel indicators for tax compliance and
governments’ deterrence efforts and employs a within-country approach to ensure
that results are not driven by unobservable heterogeneity across countries.
Chapter 3 adds to the first research objective by studying a context where trust in
government does not apply, at least not trust in the government of the country of
residence. This is the case for offshore tax avoidance, where the goods and services
financed by taxes are used but not paid for. In their consequences, tax evasion
and tax avoidance are quite similar: taxpayers contribute less to the government
budget than the legislator had earmarked, and the resulting excess burden is
borne by the compliant citizens. Yet, tax avoidance is, in most cases, not an
illegal contraction of reported income, but rather a lawful and often sophisticated
exploitation of loopholes in (international) tax laws.
The big tax leaks in 2016 (Panama Papers) and 2017 (Paradise Papers) brought
to light that not only multinational companies, but also thousands of (wealthy)
private persons made use of the legal shifting of income from high-tax to low-tax
jurisdictions. The large media attention accompanying the tax leaks focused not
only on reporting the technique and extent, but was even more so concentrated
4
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on naming and shaming prominent tax avoiders, overwhelmingly condemning this
behavior as a moral bankruptcy and as anti-social.
Chapter 3, co-authored by Andreas Wagener (d), uses a simple linear Public Goods
Game in a 2×2 design to test and causally identify the effects of induced moral
obligations (tax avoidance is legal, but is it legitimate?), proneness to framing
(moralized tax avoidance vs. a voluntary contribution) and reputational concerns
(directing attention to tax avoiders by disclosing their identity). The lab exper-
iment presented in Chapter 3 is one of the first studies to jointly and separately
analyze causal effects of moral framing and shaming. Moreover, it is the first
study to do this in the context of a legal but morally refutable action, bypassing
behavioral biases like an aversion to violate legal norms and to gamble on small
probabilities of getting caught and fined.
The second major research objective in this thesis is to explore societal determi-
nants and characteristics of trust in government, how they relate to the quality
and perception of institutions, and whether there is evidence for untested claims of
ties between trust in government and economic growth (see, e.g., OECD, 2017).
Chapter 4 studies these questions by using a cross-country design for up to 92
economies worldwide and by modeling a 2SLS and 3SLS estimator. Chapter 4
directly links to the importance of trust in government for tax compliance, which
is pivotal for a country’s fiscal capacity and thus for institutional quality and
economic development.
Chapter 4 also complements the literature on the determinants of social trust
(not directed at any specific persons or organizations) and its impact on economic
growth. Uslaner (2002) describes common underlying values – the belief that
strangers share the same fate – as the bonding element of trust, while he regards
trust in people we know as strategic and reciprocal. The author’s description of
generalized trust can, in principle, also be applied to trust in government, which
is, on the one hand, particularistic and directed, but on the other hand also works
through shared values and norms. Referring to Uslaner, the more democratic and
pluralistic a country is, the more influence citizens get – trust may become more
strategic and less dependent on shared or propagated values and norms.
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1.3 Outline of the results
Understanding the facets and consequences of trust in government is a recurring
motive in this dissertation. Chapter 2 explores the reciprocal relationship be-
tween an authority’s attitude towards deterring tax non-compliance and the trust
taxpayers put in, for example, the government. The results in Chapter 2 suggest
that both higher trust and increased deterrence efforts by the authorities are pos-
itively associated with tax compliance. This in particular the case for increased
financial capacities of tax agencies. Chapter 2 also finds support for the Slippery
Slope Framework’s moderating relationship. Deterrence is most effective when
trust in authorities is low, and vice versa. When tax enforcement becomes coer-
cive, however, it negatively affects trust and tax compliance. In particular, the
government’s signal to counter crimes with retaliation forecloses a social climate
characterized by mutual trust between taxpayers and the government.
Chapter 3 finds that framing a lack of cooperation in a public goods game as
legal but morally condemnable behavior led to increased compliance. However,
the positive effect of this moral appeal lasted only when it was combined with a
social sanction. The disclosure of tax avoiders (uncooperative participants) had no
adverse financial consequences, but proved that individuals are heavily influenced
by reputational concerns, regardless of whether it involves the legal violation of
the norm to pay (all) taxes or to voluntarily support a socially profitable public
action. Also, Chapter 3 demonstrates the importance of clarifying the purpose
of taxation and the consequences and moral responsibility of non-compliance.
Simply deciding about tax avoidance without any moral guidance led to similar
contributions as in the baseline voluntary contribution game. Without the moral
appeal presented in the experiment, participants were significantly more ready to
reveal their non-compliance.
Chapter 4 shows that, in a worldwide comparison, trust in government is not nec-
essarily coupled with the objective trustworthiness of authorities. The expected
relationship holds only for Western democracies, and the criteria of good gov-
ernance usually describe democratic ideals from a Western perspective. Other
countries and political systems might build on a different culture of trust, char-
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acterized by commitment to specific policies and a system of shared norms rather
than on the rule of law (see, e.g., Rothstein, 2015). Chapter 4 finds that peo-
ple put the highest trust in regimes that propagate pro-state attitudes and in
governments that take a pro-active role in organizing the economy, culture, and
even day-to-day life. Especially government control over the media is positively
correlated with trust in government, since authorities can both sell (alleged) good
deeds and conceal government failure in an unimpeded manner.
Many of the restrictive autocracies are also among the most dynamic emerging
economies of the world with palpable improvements in the quality of living in
the recent decades. Chapter 4 suggests that high trust in government can have
positive ties to growth despite unaccountable and unreliable institutions.2 Chap-
ter 4 does, however, not find growth-enhancing effects of trust via intermediaries
like investments and consumption. This is in contrast to some studies on social
trust and supports Rothstein and Uslaner (2005), who argue that social trust (the
willingness to get involved in social communities) is caused by governments and
institutions that promote economic equality, social cohesion and equal opportu-
nities.
Three main conclusions can be derived from this thesis. First, governments need
to be very cautious in their strategy to deter crimes like tax evasion. Trust in gov-
ernment is important for high and stable tax compliance and potentially hampered
by an antagonistic tax climate. Second, morally condemning legal tax avoidance
increases compliance, but this effect is overlaid when reputational concerns are
activated by bringing this behavior to light. Third, trust in government can have
direct positive ties to economic growth. However, trust in and the trustworthiness
of institutions are not congruent. Different cultures of trust exist, and trust in gov-
ernment can be manipulated by the government. When confidence in institutions
is not “heartfelt”, it might not evolve into social trust.
2This direct link might be supported by a lack of resistance (either through norms or because it is
enforced) to policy decisions potentially harming the well-being of individuals – the lapse of legal
hurdles and tedious democratic decision-making processes can arguably expedite investment
decisions.
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Enforce Taxes, but Cautiously: Societal
Implications of the Slippery Slope
Framework
1
2.1 Introduction
When large-scale tax evasion is uncovered, the media and the public often ve-
hemently demand (broadly) expanded tax audits and harsher penalties for tax
evaders. This reflects the expectation that tax evasion is no longer seen as a
peccadillo or as a popular sport. The adequacy of this expectation is, however,
debatable. A growing body of literature finds that voluntary tax payments2 play
an important role for the decision whether to evade taxes or not (Alm et al.,
1992, 1999; Cowell, 1990; Falkinger, 1995; Feld and Frey, 2002, 2007). Given low
probabilities of detecting tax evasion and moderate punishments in the case of
1An earlier version of Chapter 2 is available as Number 589 of the Hannover Economic Pa-
pers (HEP) series. This paper was presented at the 2016 DIBT conference “Tax Compliance
in a Globalized World” in Rust (Austria) and at the 2017 Annual Congress of the IIPF in
Tokyo. I thank Andreas Wagener for his guidance. I acknowledge valuable comments and
suggestions made by Kay Blaufus, Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Tejaswi Velayudhan, and
Reinhard Weisser.
2Taxpayers comply with the tax laws and report income honestly not because they are forced to
do so, but because they want to or feel obliged to, for example due to moral or societal norms.
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detection – the “classic” deterrence instruments for a rational agent (Allingham
and Sandmo, 1972; Becker, 1968; Yitzhaki, 1974) – scholars argue that voluntary
tax compliance might even outweigh the importance of enforcing tax payments.
The former explanatory approach, often summarized under the term tax morale
(see, e.g., Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Torgler, 2003, 2006, 2007), is regarded as an
important piece to solve the so-called tax compliance puzzle, which asks why most
people pay taxes when it would be individually rational to be non-compliant.3
The question how tax enforcement and voluntary tax compliance interact and how
they (jointly) influence the tax evasion decision is in many aspects still a black
box. Kirchler (2007) and Kirchler et al. (2008) prominently united enforced and
voluntary tax compliance in a single conceptual tool, the “Slippery Slope Frame-
work” (SSF). In the SSF, trust in authorities (as the determinant of voluntary
compliance) and power of authorities (the representation of deterrence tools) en-
hance tax compliance. The two determinants can operate independently, but also
interact with and moderate each other: when trust is low, increases in deterrence
matter most and vice versa.
The SSF considers the decisions of a single individual. This paper is a first attempt
to analyze the interplay of voluntary and enforced payments and their connection
to tax compliance on an aggregate level, treating tax evasion as a “social phe-
nomenon” (Sandmo, 2005: p. 656): how does a government signaling deterrence
or even retaliation affect the readiness to trust and to cooperate in the society?
Can mutual trust between taxpayers and government thrive when norm violations
are (severely) punished, or does deterrence act as a barrier towards voluntary tax
payments?
I examine these questions by employing a panel data set for 25 EU member states.
The present paper makes use of the first internationally (EU-wide) comparable
tax gap estimates available for multiple years. This paper also introduces novel
indicators for the degree of deterrence exerted by the state. To approximate the
(potential) frequency of tax audits, I use OECD data on the expenditures for a
country’s tax administration (as a share of GDP). To approximate the perceived
severity of punishments for crimes and as a signal towards governments’ retalia-
3See e.g. Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod (2007) for comprehensive literature reviews.
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tion, I use incarceration rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), described in more detail
in Section 2.3. From a descriptive, cross-country perspective, I assess whether
distinct patterns between the motivation to voluntarily pay taxes, deterrence,
and tax evasion are evident. With a within-country fixed effects approach I test
whether and how trust in authorities and the power of authorities moderate each
other, and if increases in either of the both determinants are associated with
higher tax compliance. While the within-country approach allows to eliminate
unobserved between-country heterogeneity, I do not aim to establish causal links
between trust, deterrence and tax compliance.
The results in this paper show that both, higher trust and increased deterrence
efforts, are associated with less tax evasion in European countries. This holds
for potential audit probabilities and to a distinctly lesser degree also for coercion
signaled by the government. The results indicate that trust and deterrence need
time to positively respond with tax compliance. This paper also finds support for
the moderating relationship put forward in the SSF: on the societal level, increases
in deterrence indeed matter most when trust in government is low, and vice versa.
When trust is not pronounced, increased deterrence is positively associated with
tax compliance. Coercive policies with severe penalties for law-violations could
eventually expedite tax evasion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews literature
on the importance of mutual trust between taxpayers and the government for
tax compliance, elaborates on the SSF in more detail, and discusses how these
concepts relate to tax evasion as an aggregate, social process. Section 2.3 discusses
the characteristics of trust in authorities, deterrence, and tax compliance in detail
and presents the indicators used for the empirical analysis. Section 2.4 provides
a short descriptive inquiry and presents the results of the fixed effects analysis.
Section 2.5 discusses the results and concludes.
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2.2 Background
2.2.1 Mutual trust and tax compliance
In his paper on Trust in Public Finance, Slemrod (2002) calls for a careful differen-
tiation of trust between private parties and trust between, for example, taxpayers
and the government. He describes the latter relationship as unique because of the
protruding role the government has in providing goods and services, the power to
tax, and the circumstance that tax payments cannot be directly translated into
individually attributable benefits. Slemrod (2002) defines trust in government
as the belief that authorities take the necessary steps to induce other taxpayers
to forgo their financial incentives to act opportunistically. This definition leaves
space to include a variety of aspects: besides law enforcement, also trust in others
and functional institutions, i.e. equity and complexity of the tax system, effi-
ciency and reliability of the government and the absence of corruption attribute
to a trustworthy government (Rothstein, 2000).
Feld and Frey (2002) describe mutual trust between tax authority and taxpayer as
a psychological contract. A breach of this contract would crowd out tax morale,
with the consequence of taxpayers developing a purely rational attitude towards
taxpaying. Other studies also connect trust, extrinsic incentives to comply with
the law, and tax compliance to crowding-effects: similar to Feld and Frey (2002),
Frey and Jegen (2001) argue that the crowding out of intrinsic compliance could
be prevented if civic virtue was bolstered by laws conveying the notion that citi-
zens were trusted. In a lab experiment, Feld and Tyran (2002) find that endoge-
nously set fines led to more tax compliance compared to fines that were imposed
exogenously. Bohnet et al. (2001) conducted a lab experiment and found that
an institution’s trustworthiness was crowded in with weak law enforcement and
crowded out with medium law enforcement. Schulze and Frank (2003) ran a lab
experiment on corruption with and without the possibility of detecting the offense.
The authors find that monitoring destroyed the intrinsic motivation for honesty,
shifting behavior towards corruption.
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2.2.2 The Slippery Slope Framework
Kirchler et al. (2008) developed the SSF with the idea of two different tax climates
in a society in mind: the antagonistic tax climate is characterized by a “cops and
robbers” attitude, where authorities and taxpayers work against each other. In
this environment, the authors argue, the government perceives all taxpayers as
potential criminals and persecutes them, while the taxpayers feel the need to
escape this oppression. In the synergistic tax climate, by contrast, authorities
act in the spirit of performing services to the public. Kirchler et al. (2008) see a
large social distance between authorities and taxpayers in the antagonistic climate,
and describe it as low in the latter: the government acts in the interest of the
public, and the taxpayers feel obliged to contribute their share and thus to enable
authorities to provide public goods and services.
Figure 2.1: The Slippery Slope Framework
Kirchler et al., 2008: p.212.
In the SSF, the antagonistic tax climate is connected to low trust in authorities
and considerable deterrence, while the reverse mix will occur in the synergistic
climate. Kirchler et al. (2008) define trust in authorities as “the general opin-
ion of individuals and social groups that the tax authorities are benevolent and
work beneficially for the common good” (p. 212), which is fostered by functional
institutions and likely results in voluntary tax compliance.
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The continuum of the two tax climates and the SSF’s features result in the three-
dimensional framework depicted in Figure 2.1. Trust in authorities [power of
authorities] can result in high tax compliance regardless of power in authorities
[trust in authorities]. The marginal returns on tax compliance are, however, de-
creasing. The joint influence and moderating relationship of trust and power is
visualized in the grid-area of Figure 2.1. The deployment of trust and power can
be substituted at will because both factors are equally valuable for tax compli-
ance. In the SSF, the perception of deterrence depends on the level of trust: if
it is low, power is perceived as coercive. In a trusting environment, deterrence is
perceived as legitimate. However, the perception of power has no consequence for
actual tax compliance, as long as tax payments are in fact enforced.
More recent works on the SSF have begun to incorporate different forms of trust.
Gangl et al. (2012) and Gangl et al. (2015) describe reason-based trust as ra-
tional, strategic and driven by knowledge, while implicit trust relies on social
identities and norms. The two forms of trust also interact differently with the
perception of power. The authors argue that coercive power would reduce im-
plicit trust, whereas it is fostered by governmental power that is perceived as
legitimate. Gangl et al. (2012) argue in favor of a third tax climate on the societal
level: in the “confidence climate”, taxpayers feel responsible for the tax system,
and the government reciprocates by avoiding extensive controls and punishment.
In the SSF, high and stable tax compliance is reached with high (or maximum)
investments in trust, power, or both. Kirchler et al. (2008) acknowledge that both,
extreme deterrence or encouragement, are not attainable, resulting in an outcome
where an inclination towards tax evasion (the slippery slope) will always prevail.
Surveys and experiments on the SSF’s mechanics find evidence for an interaction
of trust and power and for the slippery slope: when both, trust and power, were
(exogenously) set at high levels by the experimenters, tax compliance was more
pronounced than in a scenario only power or trust were high (Wahl et al., 2010,
Muehlbacher et al., 2011, Kaplanoglou et al., 2016). However, it is questionable
whether high trust and high power can or need to co-exist: on the one hand, the
two determinants appertain to different tax climates; on the other hand, focusing
on one dimension is sufficient to reach (high) tax compliance.
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2.2.3 From the individual to the aggregate perspective
Sandmo (2005) appealed for a more careful consideration of tax evasion as an
aggregation problem and called for analyses going beyond treating tax evasion
as a purely individual cost-benefit choice. He argues that non-compliance could
spread from an individual to an aggregate problem if taxpayers observe others’
evasive behavior: on the one hand, the taxpayer might perceive a smaller proba-
bility of detection; on the other hand, the (potential) disutility of evading taxes
might decrease if it is perceived as common, and the government is not trusted to
secure cooperation and to responsibly proceed with its revenues. While the SSF
considers the evasion decision of single taxpayers and treats trust in authorities as
a subjective sentiment, Kirchler et al. (2008) acknowledge the societal dimension
of tax compliance with the inclusion of the two tax climates and with power of
authorities as a public good.
Scholz and Lubell (1998) and Slemrod (2002) analyze the connection of trust
in government and tax compliance with cross-country data. Scholz and Lubell
find that higher scores in their trust measure significantly reduced the likelihood
of non-compliance. Slemrod (2002) aimed at untangling structural relationships
between trust, growth, and tax compliance with a 3SLS approach. He finds that
a more trustworthy government is generally associated with less tax cheating,
but that the acceptance of tax evasion increases as the size of the government
grows. Knack and Keefer (1997) and LaPorta et al. (1999) studied the impact of
trust on economic growth and prosperity. Both studies find significantly positive
correlations and LaPorta et al. (1999) additionally find connections of trust to
juridical efficacy and the absence of corruption. The interrelation of trust with
tax enforcement (as incorporated in the SSF) is not scrutinized in these cross-
country studies, and this paper makes an attempt to explore this missing link.4
4Lisi (2012), with a cross-country study, tried to test the SSF’s assumptions on the aggregate
level. He finds negative correlations between trust (World Values Survey data), power (proxied
with the ”Rule of Law” index (World Bank)) and tax evasion (size of the shadow economy).
However, the author failed to incorporate the interplay of trust and power, and his indicator
for “power of authorities” might be rather a measure of government trustworthiness than of
deterrence.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Tax compliance
A tax evader’s primary concern is to conceal his illegal behavior; tax evasion is
not observable, unless the non-complier is audited. Information on the extent of
noncompliance is consequentially always a rough estimate. Tax gaps, for instance,
measure the difference between planned (theoretically due) and actually collected
tax revenues. Until recently, only few countries reported tax gaps, often relying
on different estimation techniques.
Beginning in 2013, CASE Network5 has published and gradually expanded tax-gap
estimates for the EU member states (CASE, 2013, 2014, 2016). CASE focuses on a
single tax, the Value Added Tax (VAT). Using the difference between actually col-
lected and theoretically due VAT revenues to approximate for tax non-compliance
is promising for mainly two reasons: firstly, with employees’ wages often taxed
at source, the VAT is the only important tax with the possibility to cheat on.
This works best with cash-deals, where for example a handyman is hired and paid
without issuing a bill. Secondly, in most developed economies, the VAT is the
most revenue-intensive tax after the personal income tax (see for example Besley
and Persson, 2013). In this sense, concentrating on the VAT gap might give a
meaningful measure for a society’s readiness to engage in tax evasion.
In CASE (2013), the VAT Gap is defined as the difference between the theoretical
VAT liability according to national tax laws (VTTL) and the actual VAT revenue
per country and year, divided by the VTTL.6 The theoretically due tax liability
is adjusted for tax exemptions and exclusions. To transform the VAT gap to a
compliance measure, I quantify tax compliance (TC) as 100% - VAT gap (in %).7
5Center for Social and Economic Research, a non-profit research institute based in Warsaw
(Poland). CASE prepared the VAT-gap reports for the European Commission.
6The VTTL is calculated by applying appropriate VAT rates to a theoretical consumption (or
tax) base deduced from key macroeconomic figures (“top-down” approach, CASE 2013).
7Table A2.1 in the Appendix describes all data and variables used in this paper.
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2.3.2 Trust in authorities
Trust, in other people or in institutions, is subjective and has different meanings
and values attached to it, based on personal beliefs and experiences. As a rough
definition, trust is the expectation that one’s own vulnerability is not exploited by
another party. Translated to the taxpayer-government relationship, this definition
is mirrored in the “synergistic” tax climate described by Kirchler et al. (2008):
when the government uses its funds in the interest of the taxpayers, they feel
obliged to reciprocate this behavior and not to withhold the taxes they owe.
In socioeconomic surveys and opinion polls, specifically designed questions seek
to assess trust (in others or in institutions). I use a question from the European
Social Survey (ESS)8 polling for subjective trust in (the respective country’s) na-
tional parliament, to which respondents could answer on a scale ranging from 0
(no trust at all) to 10 (full trust). While items on trust in the tax authority or
in the national government are not included in the ESS, using trust in the parlia-
ment might be beneficial: the relationship between taxpayer and tax authority is
presumably very indirect. A taxpayer will only think about the agency when filing
a tax return or when being audited; trust might not be an important factor. Gov-
ernments are led by an exposed president, prime minister, or chancellor. Personal
affection or dislike could bias the evaluation of the government’s work. The work
of the parliament, by contrast, could rather be seen as a sign of the general demo-
cratic conduct: are all topics and facets the public is interested in debated? Are
the debates fair and the commerce of parliamentarians characterized by mutual
respect? Does the parliament get legislation done, and is the legislative process
transparent?
I aggregate the answers on the question of subjective trust in parliament by cal-
culating the share of trusting citizens per country and year. I define trusting as
a response between 4 and 10 on the 0-10 scale. Table A2.2 (in the Appendix)
shows that on average 61.81% (median: 62.47%) of surveyed participants in the
ESS had at least some trust in their government. The least trusting were Latvians
8The ESS aims at mapping social and political attitudes in Europe. Starting in 2002, surveys
are conducted every two years, covering more than 30 European countries.
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surveyed in 2008 (21.02%), the highest trust (90.39%) was reached in Denmark,
also in 2008.
2.3.3 Deterrence
The present paper tests two tools for deterring tax non-compliance available to au-
thorities. The first, administrative costs of the tax administration (in % of GDP)
can be used to approximate the capacity of the tax administration to detect tax
evasion, for example with expanded audits and more personnel, or with better and
time-saving technologies. However, this measure is endogenous to tax compliance:
more tax evasion could either result in less resources that can be allocated to the
tax agency, or motivate the government to invest in audit capacities all the more.
Independent of budgetary concerns, the second tool uses the number of inmates
(per 100,000 inhabitants) in a country to approximate how rigidly a government
tries to daunt rule- or norm breaking; thus, to what extent a government adopts a
“cops and robbers” attitude towards the citizens, for example if the law threatens
harsh (prison-) sentences even for minor offenses. The opposite are legal systems
which count on social re-integration instead of retribution.
Tax administration expenditures. Data for this particular source of gov-
ernment expenditures come from the OECD (2015) in its “Tax Administration
2015” report. The numbers reported by the OECD were not provided for all 25
EU countries in this sample and also only available for a limited number of years.
To counter the resulting gaps in the sample, I linearly interpolated the data for
all countries where multiple observations were available.
A glance at the data shows that, relative to the GDP, expenses for the tax admin-
istration are very low, the sample average is .25% of GDP. Thus, even a seemingly
small increase of .1 percentage points could have a large effect. However, variation
within countries and over time is small (see Figure A2.3).
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Incarceration rates are obtained from the Institute for Criminal Policy Re-
search (ICPR).9 The ICPR provides data for countries worldwide, typically in
a two-year frequency. Research on incarceration as a signal for a government’s
retributive attitude first and foremost originates from political sciences and soci-
ology. In these fields scholars describe imprisonment primarily as a political force
and the prison as a political institution (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Smith,
2004; Shannon and Uggen, 2012). Studies on the use of prisons as a tool for
governmental power focus almost exclusively on the USA. Incarceration rates in
the USA are well above 700 (per 100,000 inhabitants), around five times higher
than in the European Union. However, this constantly expanding disparity is not
matched by a similar increase in crime rates (Smith, 2004; Shannon and Uggen,
2012). As a consequence, Smith (2004) sees imprisonment as the demonstration
of the state’s coercive powers. In a sense, the government uses the size of the
prison population as a signal to what extent it dislikes and punishes wrongdoing.
Garland (1991) points out that until the 1960s incarceration in the USA had been
very similar to the numbers in Western Europe and then started to climb sharply,
resulting in growing pessimism and distrust. Already Pincoffs (1966) noted a shift
in the justification for punishment towards retribution and get-tough policies.10
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive analysis
Figure 2.2 plots all available observations for countries’ trust in authorities and
the intensity of deterrence (tax administration expenses in Panel A, incarceration
rates in Panel B), displaying the interplay of the two determinants on a descriptive
level. The data in Figure 2.2 is pooled across countries and years, and visually
separated by differences in the corresponding tax compliance.
9http://www.prisonstudies.org/map/europe (as of August 14th, 2018)
10Of course, only a vanishingly small number of prisoners are convicted tax evaders, and a
greater proportion of inmates by no means implies reduced opportunities to commit tax fraud.
Imprisonment describes the “cops and robbers” attitude of authorities in a broad sense because
it typifies the risk of getting (severely) punished for engaging in unlawful behavior in general.
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Figure 2.2: Data plotted in the Trust-Deterrence space
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Pooled sample (over countries and years). Panel A: trust in authorities (% of the population)
is plotted against the administrative costs of the tax administration. Panel B: trust is plotted
against the incarceration rate (per 100,000 inhabitants). Circles: observation corresponds with
tax compliance smaller or equal to 85%. Squares: tax compliance within 85% and 90%. Di-
amonds: tax compliance above 90%. Lines represent linear fits for the different levels of tax
compliance.
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Circles in Figure 2.2 represent tax compliance smaller or equal to 85%, squares
tax compliance between 85% and 90%, and diamonds tax compliance above 90%.
The lines in Figure 2.2 represent linear fits of the correlation between deterrence
and trust in authorities. The linear fits are corrected for outliers. For high tax
compliance (black lines) observations were excluded when the share of the trusting
population fell below 40%. For intermediate tax compliance (medium gray lines)
trust had to lie between 40% and 60%, while for low tax compliance (light gray
lines) observations were excluded when trust was greater or equal to 50%.
Panel A of Figure 2.2 shows the correlates between trust in government and the
budget-based measure for deterring tax evasion. Across countries and years, the
determinants are not correlated. This is line with the conception of the SSF,
where trust in authorities and the power of authorities are two separate strategies
to raise tax compliance. The budget for the tax administration is in most cases
quite low, rarely exceeding .3% of the GDP.
Panel A suggests that high trust generally coincides with high tax compliance,
examples are countries like Denmark, Sweden, Finland, or the Netherlands. The
lower trust in government, the lower tax compliance (intercepts of the linear fits).
Regardless of the extent of non-compliance, the very flat (negative) slopes of the
linear fits suggest that trust in government and deterrence could (across countries)
be substituted almost at will.
Panel B of Figure 2.2 looks at the incarceration rates as a political signal to deter
crimes and presents a different picture. Trust in government and the propensity
to punish crimes with imprisonment are negatively correlated (r = -.53, p <.001).
As in Panel A, more trust coincides with higher tax compliance. Yet, for low
and medium tax compliance (light and medium gray line), the trade-off between
trust and deterrence is very small (comparable to Panel A). This changes for
those observations where both trust and tax compliance are high; an increase
in deterrence (more incarceration) is correlated with a considerable loss of trust.
Ubiquitous punishments for crimes (in general, not specifically for tax evasion)
and high trust never go hand in hand.
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2.4.2 Within-country analysis
Equation (2.1) describes the model employed for the fixed effects analysis. Tax
compliance (TC) in country i in year t is the dependent variable, trust in au-
thorities (voluntary compliance) and deterrence the predictors of interest. Trust
contains the share of people stating trust in the national parliament in a given
country in a given year. Thus, β1 measures the response of tax compliance to a
one-percent increase in the trusting population. When Deterrence is measured by
the budget for the tax administration (as a share of GDP), β2 gives the response of
TC to a .1 percentage point increase in the budget. In most countries, this would
mean a major policy change, often doubling the expenses for the tax administra-
tion. For the incarceration rates, β2 measures the response of tax compliance to
one additional prisoner (per 100,000 inhabitants), a comparably marginal change.
TCit = β0 + β1Trustit + β2Deterrenceit + β3Trustit ×Deterrenceit (2.1)
+β4Xit + FEi + FEt + ui + it
Vector Xit contains variables which may affect tax compliance besides trust and
deterrence. Country fixed effects (FEi) ensure that the effect of deterrence and
trust on tax compliance is estimated for each country by measuring yearly de-
viations from the country’s respective mean. The inclusion of time fixed effects
(FEt) captures the influence of aggregate time-dependent trends. The analysis
will also make use of the panel’s dynamic structure by introducing leads, lags, and
first differences to the dependent variable.
The interaction term (β3) is of central importance to analyze the interplay and
moderation of trust and governmental power. In regression tables, β3 gives only
a slope; neither the effect size nor the statistical significance can be meaningfully
interpreted. In the present paper, the interaction term is always negative and has
a very flat slope, meaning that the effect of an increase in trust [deterrence] on tax
compliance becomes smaller the greater deterrence [trust], but that the impact
of a marginal change is small. β3 does, however, not reveal whether the effect is
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initially positive or negative, or if it becomes negative at high levels of trust or
deterrence. To illustrate the moderating relationship of the two determinants and
to meaningfully interpret the interaction term, marginal effects (thus, the effect of
an increase in one variable, evaluated at different levels of the moderator variable)
are calculated and visualized in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 below.
Expenses for the tax administration as deterrence. Column (1) of Ta-
ble 2.1 shows that neither trust nor the tax administration expenditures or their
interaction are positively correlated with tax compliance. Yet, specification (1) es-
timates the response of TC in year t to changes in the explanatory variables in the
same year. Likely, changes in the administrative costs for the tax administration
and in trust will need time to affect tax compliance.
Table 2.1: Within-country analysis, Part I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TC TCt+1 ∆TCt+1,t TCt-1
Trust 0.062 0.227∗ 0.279∗ 0.038
(0.117) (0.113) (0.135) (0.131)
Deterrence 1.538 6.889∗∗ 7.912∗∗ −2.222
(3.033) (3.085) (3.469) (3.399)
Trust × Deterrence −0.011 −0.085∗ −0.103∗ 0.045
(0.036) (0.041) (0.050) (0.042)
Unemployment −0.187 0.162 0.414 −0.822∗∗∗
(0.367) (0.325) (0.369) (0.253)
Budget deficit −0.039 −0.080 −0.066 −0.083
(0.135) (0.150) (0.233) (0.129)
Service sector −1.094∗∗ −0.830∗∗ 0.453 −0.402
(0.493) (0.357) (0.487) (0.487)
GDP per capita −1.217 −1.001∗ 0.505 −1.788∗∗∗
(0.764) (0.533) (0.801) (0.595)
VAT rate −0.134 0.524 0.793 −0.363
(0.556) (0.526) (0.764) (0.433)
Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 125 99 99 99
R2 0.315 0.318 0.268 0.395
Notes: Within-country fixed effects estimates. Year fixed-effects included
whenever jointly significant (Wald-Test). The measure for deterrence is
a country’s expenses on the tax administration (% of GDP) Trust is the
share of the trusting population.. Robust standard errors are in paren-
theses. When no subscripts are used, variables represent present values.
∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
Thus, column (2) of Table 2.1 tests the associations to changes in the explanatory
variables in year t and tax compliance in year t+1, i.e. two years later (ESS
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surveys take place every two years). Holding all other variables constant, a one
percent increase in trust in government is now significantly correlated with a raise
in tax compliance of .23 percentage points. Deterrence in t is also significantly
positively associated with tax compliance in the following time period. An in-
crease of .1 percentage points in expenditures for the tax administration (% of
GDP) is estimated to increase tax compliance by 6.9 percentage points.11 The in-
teraction term is also statistically significant and will be visualized and discussed
in Figure 2.3 below.
Column (3) of Table 2.1 uses the change from tax compliance in year t to year
t+1 as the dependent variable, further exploiting the dynamic structure of the
panel: in column (3), the coefficients of the explanatory variables do not show
the response of tax compliance in t+1 in levels, but the impact on changes in
TC. The coefficient sizes and the statistical significance are robust to this change.
Column (4) uses past tax compliance (dependent variable) as a robustness check;
current levels of trust and deterrence should not explain past tax compliance –
this is the case.
All specifications in Table 2.1 include the following control variables: a higher un-
employment rate points towards a more constrained budget for taxpayers. Except
for column (4), unemployment is not significantly correlated with tax compliance.
The same holds for countries’ public budget deficit, which arguably could imply
both an incentive for authorities to generate additional revenues but at the same
time means less resources available to enforce tax payments and to invest in trust-
worthiness. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.1, a larger service sector (share of
GDP) is significantly correlated with less tax compliance. Since most everyday
chances to evade the VAT will occur in the retail business, the association is of
the expected sign (see also CASE, 2018). Further controls included are per capita
GDP and the VAT rate.
Panel A of Figure 2.3 depicts the marginal effect of a one-percent increase in
the trusting population on tax compliance, evaluated at different levels of tax
administration expenditures. The negative slope indicates that the impact of
11Tax compliance in year t will influence TC in year t+1. However, with a small t, including
lagged tax compliance as an additional control variable would introduce endogeneity to the
statistical model (see, e.g., Nickell, 1981).
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Figure 2.3: The Moderating Effect of Trust and Deterrence, Part I
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This Figure is the graphical representation of the interaction effect in column (3) of Table 2.1.
Panel (A) shows the marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the non-trusting
population in on tax compliance, evaluated at different expenditures on the tax administration
(% of GDP). Panel (B) depicts the marginal effect of a .1 percentage point increase in the tax
administration’s budget (relative to the GDP) , evaluated at rising levels of trust in society.
90% confidence intervals are depicted.
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additional trust in authorities becomes smaller the more extensive deterrence is.
However, only at comparably high expenses the marginal effect turns negative,
but is statistically not significant.
The association of additional trust and tax compliance is only significantly positive
when tax administration expenditures do not exceed about .1% of GDP. This is
in line with the SSF, where a change in trust in authorities matters most when
the power of authorities is weak. The large confidence intervals reflect the wide
range of trust in authorities found across expenses for the tax administration.
Panel B of Figure 2.3 shows the partial effect of an increase in deterrence, eval-
uated at the share of the trusting population. Because of the strong impact of
a (large) increases in tax administration expenditures, the association with tax
compliance remains significantly positive at least until the share of people having
trust in authorities does not exceed about 65%. Only when trust in society is very
high the marginal effect turns negative, but is statistically not significant.
Incarceration rates as deterrence. Table 2.2 estimates Equation 2.1 with
the incarceration rates (per 100,000 inhabitants) in a country as the measure
for punishments of crimes as a political signal to taxpayers, and uses the same
control variables as in Table 2.1. Column (1) and (2) test immediate responses
of explanatory and dependent variables. In column (1) neither of the variables of
interest is significantly correlated with tax compliance. Column (2) suggests that
this is partly due to including the size of the service sector as a control. Without
it, Trust and the interaction term are significantly correlated with the dependent
variable. As in Table 2.1, the size of the service sector is important for the VAT
gap in the same time period. Throughout all models in Table 2.2, the alternative
Deterrence measure is never positively associated with tax compliance.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.2 use tax compliance in time period t+1 and the
first difference of tax compliance as the dependent variable. Again, neither of the
predictors of interest is significantly associated with TC; this is independent from
whether the size of the service sector is included as a control variable or not.
Reconnecting to the arguments by Gangl et al. (2012) and Gangl et al. (2015)
discussed in Section 2.2, this lack of significant responses and the differences to
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Table 2.2: Within-country analysis, Part II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TC TC TCt+1 ∆TCt+1,t TCt-1
Trust 0.238 0.317∗∗ 0.317 0.077 0.264∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.130) (0.212) (0.262) (0.079)
Deterrence 0.081 0.108 0.135 0.024 −0.010
(0.085) (0.094) (0.010) (0.141) (0.043)
Trust × Deterrence −0.002 −0.002∗ −0.002 −0 −0.001
(0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008)
Unemployment −0.272 −0.528∗∗ 0.030 0.402 −0.861∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.234) (0.286) (0.401) (0.179)
Budget deficit −0.011 0.206 0.041 0.052 −0.119
(0.120) (0.150) (0.110) (0.176) (0.086)
Service sector −0.909∗ −0.448 0.593 −0.302
(0.456) (0.321) (0.585) (0.350)
GDP per capita −1.349∗ −1.454∗∗ −1.448∗∗ 0.097 −1.685∗∗∗
(0.702) (0.684) (0.523) (0.723) (0.535)
VAT rate −0.013 0.041 0.111 0.170 0.152
(0.333) (0.368) (0.431) (0.540) (0.270)
Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 135 135 107 107 106
R2 0.348 0.291 0.314 0.230 0.468
Notes: Within-country fixed effects estimates. Year fixed-effects included when-
ever jointly significant (Wald-Test). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Trust is the share of the trusting population. When no subscripts are used, vari-
ables represent present values. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
Table 2.1 might be explained by incarceration being perceived as coercive power,
which, according to the authors, reduces or even forecloses the development of
(implicit) trust. Instead, financial investments in the tax agency could be per-
ceived as a legitimate way to combat free-riding. Hence, (reason-based) trust
increases, making coercive practices unnecessary. Only when the budget for the
tax administration is, for example, more than doubled, taxpayers might become
suspicious and begin to doubt that the government’s policy is in their interest (see
Figure 2.3).
Lastly, column (5) of Table 2.2 again uses past tax compliance (dependent vari-
able) as a robustness check. Trust in year t is significantly correlated with tax
compliance in the previous period, further weakening the explanatory power of
the model with the incarceration rates as the tool for deterring tax evasion.
Panel A of Figure 2.4 depicts the marginal effect of a one-percent increase in the
trusting population on tax compliance, evaluated at different incarceration rates.
With low deterrence, additional trust has a positive effect, which decreases with
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Figure 2.4: The Moderating Effect of Trust and Deterrence, Part
II
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This Figure is the graphical representation of the interaction effect in column (2) of Table 2.2.
Panel (A) shows the marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the non-trusting
population in on tax compliance, evaluated at different levels of extrinsic incentives. Panel (B)
depicts the marginal effect of a one unit increase in power on tax compliance, evaluated at rising
levels of distrust in society. 90% confidence intervals are depicted.
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increasing coercion. At an incarceration rate of about 150 the prediction becomes
negative, but is significant only at extreme levels of deterrence; this is in some
contrast to Figure 2.3.
Panel B of Figure 2.4 displays the marginal effect of one additional inmate (per
100,000 inhabitants) on tax compliance, evaluated at different levels of trust.
When trust in society is very low, additional deterrence is predicted to positively
influence tax compliance. This association is, however, not statistically significant.
When trust in authorities is pronounced, additional deterrence is significantly cor-
related with increased tax evasion. This is also in contrast to Panel B in Figure 2.3,
where increased deterrence (thus, a larger budget for the tax administration) was
significantly positively associated with tax compliance when a majority of citizens
did not state trust in the country’s authorities. When trust in a society is pro-
nounced, a “cops and robbers” attitude by the government might be connected
to less compliance with the law.
2.4.3 Robustness checks
Excluding outliers. While between-country variation in the data used in this
paper is substantial, the Figures A2.1-A2.4 in the Appendix show that within-
country variation is rather low in a large number of countries. Table 2.3 tests the
robustness of the within-country analysis when “outliers” are excluded from the
sample. A country is classified as an outlier when the variance in one or more of
the variables Tax Compliance, Trust, and Deterrence is on average more than
one standard deviation above the pooled sample mean. Table 2.3 estimates the
models with the current TC and tax compliance in year t+1 for both tools of
“power of authorities”.
Columns (1) and (2) estimate Equation 2.1 with the tax administration expendi-
tures as the measure for Deterrence. The countries that dropped out are Bulgaria,
Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Spain. While the variables of interest in
column (1) remain comparable to Table 2.1, the correlates for trust in authori-
ties, deterrence, and their interaction decrease in size and become insignificant in
column (2) of Table 2.3; the standard error for Deterrence is large.
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Table 2.3: Within-country analysis, Part III
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deterrence: Expenses on tax administration Incarceration rates
TC TCt+1 TC TCt+1
Trust 0.109 −0.073 0.284∗∗∗ −0.017
(0.189) (0.261) (0.092) (0.151)
Deterrence −2.266 −2.568 0.096∗ −0.025
(5.006) (6.336) (0.048) (0.099)
Trust × Deterrence 0.003 0.051 −0.002∗ 0.0
(0.078) (0.090) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment −0.254 −0.575∗ −0.518 −0.478
(0.481) (0.315) (0.444) (0.431)
Budget deficit −0.020 0.043 0.035 0.187∗
(0.093) (0.074) (0.091) (0.096)
Service sector −0.664 −0.328 −0.592 −0.240
(0.416) (0.278) (0.363) (0.354)
GDP per capita −0.941 −1.488∗∗∗ −1.378∗∗ −1.613∗∗∗
(0.831) (0.458) (0.577) (0.526)
VAT rate −1.086 0.387 −0.390 −0.102
(0.737) (0.629) (0.408) (0.397)
Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 91 72 100 82
R2 0.366 0.370 0.451 0.384
Notes: Within-country fixed effects estimates. Year fixed-effects are included. Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses. When no subscripts are used, variables
represent present values. Countries in this Table are excluded when the variance in
tax compliance, trust, or deterrence was more than one standard deviation above the
sample mean in at least one of the three variables. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p <
0.01.
With the incarceration rates as the measure for the power of authorities, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Poland drop out of the sample.
In column (3) of Table 2.3 the results and the model fit improve in comparison to
column (1) of Table 2.2, while in column (4) the results for the variables of interest
remain statistically insignificant, and the coefficient sizes shrink. The results from
excluding those countries with large within-variation (in either trust or deterrence
or tax compliance) should, however, not surprise: when, on average, no palpable
changes in the tax compliance policy occur, an effect should not be expected.
Alternative measures for trust in authorities. Table 2.4 estimates the
model described in Equation 2.1 with three alternative proxies for trust in author-
ities: the satisfaction with the government, trust in the country’s legal system,
and general trust in politicians. All items are included in the ESS and use the
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same 0-10 answer scale as the trust in parliament question. In Table 2.4, average
values (per country and year) instead of the share of the trusting population are
used.12
Table 2.4: Alternative measures for trust in authorities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deterrence: Expenses on tax admin. Incarceration rates
TC TCt+1 TC TCt+1
Trust: satisfaction with government
Trust 0.433 1.933 −0.183 2.0
(1.451) (1.451) (2.067) (1.417)
Deterrence 1.740 4.954∗ −0.026 0.078
(2.642) (2.607) (0.094) (0.068)
Trust×Deterrence −0.217 −0.868∗∗ −0.0 −0.019
(0.440) (0.479) (0.015) (0.013)
Observations 124 98 134 106
R2 0.313 0.278 0.321 0.273
Trust: confidence in the legal system
Trust 3.437∗∗ 1.919 3.823 4.824
(1.468) (2.135) (2.317) (3.939)
Deterrence 2.548 7.771∗∗ 0.039 0.253∗
(3.099) (3.005) (0.103) (0.142)
Trust×Deterrence −0.280 −1.250∗∗ −0.013 −0.053∗
(0.453) (0.491) (0.017) (0.030)
Observations 125 99 135 107
R2 0.346 0.318 0.354 0.335
Trust: confidence in politicians
Trust 1.717 2.971∗ 3.311 2.515
(1.756) (1.584) (3.153) (3.616)
Deterrence 1.800 6.234∗∗ 0.045 0.082
(2.901) (2.867) (0.094) (0.1)
Trust×Deterrence −0.249 −1.288∗ −0.02 −0.026
(0.521) (0.648) (0.020) (0.029)
Observations 125 99 135 107
R2 0.320 0.314 0.334 0.221
Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Country FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year FE Y es Y es Y es Y es
Notes:Within-country fixed effects estimates. Control variables included: see
Table 2.1. Trust alternatives coded on a 0-10 scale. Mean values per country
and year are used. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
12Estimating the models in Tables 2.1-2.3 with the average value of “trust in parliament” re-
turned similar results. Using the share of the trusting population in particular facilitated the
interpretation of the partial effects in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
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Satisfaction with the government and trust in parliament are highly correlated
(r=.88, p <.001). Yet, it is not significantly associated with tax compliance in
any of the models estimated in Table 2.4. Trust and satisfaction might have
different meanings and implications. The latter is perhaps connected to a more
factual evaluation of the government’s work, thus, whether it processes campaign
pledges and if it acts in accordance with the voters’ expectations or wishes. Trust,
on the other hand, could be more intuitive and detached from a government’s
actual success. Rather, it depends on a general attitude and societal climate,
as described by Kirchler et al. (2008). Deterrence and the interaction term in
column (2) of Table 2.4 is significantly correlated with tax compliance, but the
coefficient’s magnitude is smaller compared to Table 2.1.
Trust in the legal system and trust in politicians are also highly correlated with
trust in the national parliament (r=.9, p <.001). Trust in the legal system ar-
guably means that the authorities can be trusted in terms of protecting personal
and property rights, equality before the law, and that politicians or interest groups
are constrained in their powers. Politicians constitute and represent the parlia-
ment, but have also individual agendas and responsibilities, adding a personal
note to trust in the parliament (or the legal system), which is in essence trust
in an (impersonal) authority or a system. In column (1) of Table 2.4, trust in
the legal system is significantly correlated with tax compliance. In columns (2)
and (4) this is the case for the respective deterring instrument and the interaction
term. Confidence in politicians is significantly positively associated with tax com-
pliance in column (2), as are deterrence (tax administration expenditures) and
the interaction term. In the other specifications the variables of interest fail to
reach statistical significance.
2.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
The literature recognizes two major determinants of tax compliance: deterrence
and voluntary tax payments. While increasing importance is attributed to the
latter driver, the broad public seems to favor a “law and order” approach towards
(potential) tax evaders. Deterring misconduct and the intrinsic motivation to
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voluntarily follow laws can be assumed to be closely tied, and Kirchler et al. (2008)
were the first to conceptualize these interrelations. The present paper aimed to
explore whether high deterrence efforts could contribute to high tax compliance,
or whether they may be adversely associated with the voluntary tax payments.
The findings suggest that both determinants are associated with reduced tax eva-
sion, but also that deterrence efforts by the government and a trusting societal
environment do not go hand in hand. The more severe deterrence becomes, the
smaller is the positive response of tax compliance on an increase in trust towards
authorities. The interrelation of trust and power differs with the deterrence in-
strument used. In low-trusting environments, a larger budget for the tax admin-
istration is correlated with a significant increase in tax compliance, which is not
the case for coercive punishments for crimes. This notion might speak in favor of
the argument brought forward by Gangl et al. (2012): signaling get-tough policies
and retaliation is met by distrust; taxpayers wonder if they and the authorities
have common goals, even if coercion is not very pronounced. Conversely, invest-
ments in the tax administration are seen as a signal that the government wants
to impede free-riding to the benefit of the compliant taxpayers. This increases
authorities’ legitimate powers, at least as long as they do not squeeze deterrence
too hard.
A moderate attitude towards penalizing offenses might be the expression of a social
contract promoting societal peace, egality, and the idea of social re-integration of
offenders. Such values could be understood as trust in citizens’ good intentions,
which is reciprocated by the taxpayers (synergistic tax climate, see Section 2.2).
Coercion could be interpreted as a sign of distrust and retaliation; in essence the
“antagonistic” tax climate described by Kirchler et al. (2008). This climate is
characterized by a lack of trust, commonly found in Eastern European countries.
Of course, completely waiving tax enforcement would not be applicable, and likely
be accompanied by a loss of trust in authorities. Taxpayers might react with
increased evasion if they noticed that cooperative behavior and property was not
protected against exploiters and free-riders. Dwenger et al. (2016), for instance,
show with a field experiment that taxpayers adopt a rational attitude towards tax
compliance when a zero-deterrence policy is clearly and transparently conveyed.
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Data restrictions limited the sample size in this paper with respect to country-
coverage and timespan. Tax non-compliance is concealed behavior and has to
rely on (rough) estimates, and neither trust in the tax authority nor the power of
authorities is directly and reliably measurable, too. Interesting questions that re-
main unanswered are whether the results hold for countries worldwide (especially
developing economies) and how the interplay of extrinsic incentives and intrinsic
motivation will affect tax revenues in the long run.
No causal inferences are drawn in this paper. Trust in authorities and power of
authorities are by definition reciprocal. In the SSF, subjective trust is (also) a
function of perceived power and vice versa. Consider trust in authorities: high or
increased tax compliance might act as a signal towards the government’s success
in securing revenues to provide goods and services for the public, and for the
success in discouraging free-riding at the cost of the society. While feedback
cycles between power, trust, and tax compliance come very natural in the SSF’s
dynamics, potential measurement error is a more severe issue. Trust, for instance,
is influenced by an array of personal traits and attitudes, factors which not only
contribute to trust but also to tax compliance directly (for example corruption
and rent-seeking, tax knowledge, social and personal norms), and by a number of
economic surroundings like income or unemployment. Many of these influences
are subjective and not observable.
The results in this paper could be also used as a starting point to analyze the role
of tax enforcement and voluntary compliance on a more conceptual, public finance
level. Tax enforcement and trust in authorities are additional production factors
to tax revenue. High trust produces substantial tax revenues, a focus on coercion
leads to less tax compliance. Both factors are costly for the government to supply,
calling for the derivation of an optimal policy mix. Meanwhile, consuming the two
(public) goods might be connected to contradicting behavioral responses on behalf
of the taxpayers, leading to distortionary taxation in both cases.
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Appendix Chapter 2
Table A2.1: Sources and Descriptions of the data
Variable Source Description
Tax Compliance = 100% -
VAT-Gap
CASE Network Re-
ports 2013, 2014,
2016
VAT-Gap: Difference between the estimated,
theoretical tax liability in a country and the
actual VAT (Value Added Tax) revenue col-
lected, as a share of the theoretical tax liabil-
ity.
Trust in authorities European Social Sur-
vey (ESS)
ESS Rounds 1-7; Individual answers on how
high is “trust in parliament”, on a scale from
0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).
Deterrence (budget of the tax
administration)
OECD (2015) Expenses on the national tax administration
in % of GDP
Deterrence (incarceration
rates)
Institute for Crimi-
nal Policy Research
(ICPR)
Prison population rate (per 100,000 of national
population)
Per-capita GDP World Bank In PPP-dollars.
Unemployment rate World Bank Unemployed among the total labor force, in
percent
Value Added Tax (VAT) rate CASE (2013) Full rate in a country in a given year. Reduced
rates and exemptions are not considered.
Size of the service sector Eurostat Percentage of GDP.
Budget deficit Eurostat As a percentage of GDP
Satisfaction with government ESS ESS Rounds 1-7. Individual answers on a scale
ranging from 0 (none) to 10 (full).
Trust in the legal system ESS ESS Rounds 1-7. Individual answers on a scale
ranging from 0 (none) to 10 (full).
Trust in politicians ESS ESS Rounds 1-7. Individual answers on a scale
ranging from 0 (none) to 10 (full).
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Table A2.2: List of countries
Country Number
of obser-
vations
Mean
Tax Com-
pliance
(%)
Mean
% of
trusting
popula-
tion
Mean
incar-
ceration
rate
Mean
expense
on tax
admin-
istration
(% of
GDP)
Austria 4 89.25 70.95 100.75 0.15
Belgium 7 87.71 73.55 94.71 0.33
Bulgaria 4 86.50 25.84 134.00 0.23
Czech Rep. 6 78.67 44.57 189.17 0.19
Denmark 7 90.29 87.20 68.43 0.33
Estonia 6 85.33 60.72 278.83 0.18
Finland 7 89.43 84.40 64.26 0.20
France 7 85.43 64.39 95.14 0.23
Germany 7 88.29 64.91 86.57 0.28
Greece 4 72.75 53.67 90.75
Hungary 7 75.14 52.31 164.57 0.35
Ireland 7 91.00 60.15 84.00 0.24
Italy 2 74.00 60.06 103.50 0.25
Latvia* 1 74.00 21.02 299.00 0.34
Lithuania 3 62.00 36.86 306.67 0.15
Luxembourg 2 88.50 85.57 108.00 0.27
Netherlands 7 94.29 80.70 103.67 0.36
Poland 7 83.29 39.54 214.43 0.27
Portugal 7 90.43 49.47 122.14 0.25
Romania* 1 63.00 52.74 128.00 0.22
Slovak Rep. 5 69.20 50.19 173.20 0.19
Slovenia 7 92.29 50.82 63.43 0.28
Spain 7 89.71 67.68 144.86 0.13
Sweden 7 96.00 84.24 71.71 0.18
United Kingdom 7 88.00 62.41 146.86
Average 5.44 85.77 61.81 128.27 0.25
Note: *: countries with only one observation are omitted in the within-country analysis for
statistical reasons.
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Chapter 3
Bringing Tax Avoiders to Light:
Moral Framing and Shaming in a
Public Goods Experiment
1
3.1 Introduction
Over the past years, the media has repeatedly reported on large-scale tax avoid-
ance schemes by firms and wealthy individuals, often assisted by wealth man-
agement firms and the professional classes. Some of the reported activities may
constitute criminal tax evasion, fraud, or money laundering – but most seem per-
fectly legal. Still, the press and the wider public judge their escape from taxes as
morally reprehensible, opportunistic and disreputable. The incriminated persons
may not have violated any law, but their behavior is seen as debasing the spirit of
the tax law for the sake of personal gains. The broad media coverage has not only
1This chapter is co-authored by Andreas Wagener (d). We acknowledge funding by the German
Research Council (DFG) in its RTG 1723 “Globalization and Development”. This paper was
presented at the “Finanzwissenschaftlicher Workshop” in Goettingen (2017), the RGS Doctoral
Conference in Essen, the ZEW Public Finance in Mannheim, the 2nd GlaD conference in
Goettingen, the Annual IIPF Congress in Tampere, and the annual meeting of the “Verein fu¨r
Socialpolitik” in Freiburg im Breisgau (all in 2018). We are grateful to Kay Blaufus, Sarah
Ciaglia, Bjo¨rn Jahnke and Susan Steiner for insightful discussions. We thank Michael Milde
for technical and organizational support.
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brought that behavior to light but it overwhelmingly also issued a devastating
moral verdict. For the politicians, sports stars, artists or business people who
were pilloried for tax avoidance, the unprecedented and embarrassing publicity
damaged their reputation – and the shaming might deter them and others in the
future.
These recent developments exemplify two insights: first, socially cooperative be-
havior often cannot be fully formalized in laws, legislated and judicially enforced.
Rather it requires a specific “morality” – a sense of virtue and decency, of duty
and civic obligations – or a normatively “right” demeanor. Appeals to this moral-
ity may positively affect individuals’ pro-social behavior. Second, to reinforce or
induce socially warranted behavior, informal reputational mechanisms – for exam-
ple the naming and shaming of alleged tax dodgers – may play an important role.
The experience or already the fear of being visibly identified to the general public
or to one’s peers as non-cooperative and opportunistic can make individuals act
more cooperatively.
Although often working together, moral loading and shaming are two distinct
triggers for cooperative behavior. While a number of things are known about how
these triggers work separately – moral framing through subtle nudges rather than
by direct cues, and shaming through blatant exposure – their joint effects are still
scarcely studied (see Section 3.2). Which one is stronger? Can they reinforce each
other, or does one behavioral trigger crowd-out the other?
In this paper, we report an experimental study that separates and interacts the
two triggers and analyzes their differential impact. Our experiment consisted
of a public goods game that was played with two different but equivalent (at
least within standard economic logic) descriptions: first, in a neutral form as a
voluntary contribution mechanism and, second, as a morally loaded tax avoidance
game where not paying taxes is presented as a legally adequate but possibly
socially questionable behavior. Either variant was played both with and without
shaming, i.e., disclosing to the other players the names and pictures of individuals
whose contributions fell short of what is socially warranted.
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We, first, show that shaming is an effective reputational mechanism towards so-
cially cooperative behavior: with disclosure of an individual’s lack of cooperation,
contributions are between 60 to 120 percent higher than in treatments without
disclosure. Both for the neutral and for the morally loaded setting we find that
when shaming looms, participants seek to avoid it. The differences become smaller
in later rounds, but remain significant until the end of the experiment.
Second, moral loading also increases pro-social behavior significantly. However, its
impact pales against the shaming effect – and it evaporates and becomes insignif-
icant in later stages of the experiment. In an extension to our initial 2×2 design
we find further evidence for the principal effectiveness of moral loading: without
framing tax avoidance as morally debatable, cooperation is similar to undisclosed
voluntary contributions, while shaming is less abundant when tax avoidance was
not morally loaded.
In sum, (the threat) of disclosing unwarranted behavior is an effective strategy for
reducing tax avoidance and, more generally, for promoting pro-social behavior.
The communication of moral arguments also works but is less effective and, once
a shaming mechanism is in place, has no noticeable effect.
In the following, Section 3.2 of this paper reviews literature on relevant aspects
of our topic. Section 3.3 outlines our hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the ex-
perimental design in detail. Section 3.5 contains the experimental protocol and
summary statistics of our sample of participants. In Section 3.6 we present and
interpret the main results of our experiments. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Framing. In our experiment we introduce framing by rephrasing an economi-
cally equivalent decision from a voluntary contribution to a tax payment. Public
goods games are one point in case to show the efficacy of framing, for example
by describing positive vs. negative externalities (Andreoni, 1995) or outcomes
(Sonnemans et al., 1998; Boehm and Theelen, 2016), or by framing a community
game as a stock market game (Ellingsen et al., 2012).
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Studies relying on lab experiments also document that moral motivations gener-
ally matter when people make decisions (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 2013). A central
objective of our experiment is to frame the question whether to avoid taxes or not
as a moral duty and a civic obligation. We opt for a very salient moral appeal
that informs and debates tax avoidance, but leaves broad liberties to participants
on how to judge tax avoidance (see Section 3.4 for a detailed description). Thus,
we decide against simple moral suasion or stating a behavioral rule, which find
inconclusive support in lab experiments (see Luttmer and Singhal (2014) for a
review) and field experiments on tax compliance.
For example Blumenthal et al. (2001) and Meiselman (2018) sent normative ap-
peals to taxpayers in Minnesota respectively to non-filers in Detroit and found
that such appeals had no effect, while messages on penalty salience and compli-
ance costs raised taxed income. Hallsworth et al. (2017), in a large-scale field
experiment in the UK, find that e.g. mentioning that most taxpayers are com-
pliant has a significantly larger effect on payments of overdue taxes than norms
appealing to social responsibility. Dal Bo´ and Dal Bo´ (2014), in a lab experiment,
found positive but very short-lived effects of moral suasion.
A smaller number of field experiments find positive effects of moral appeals: Fell-
ner et al. (2013) tested the effects of moral appeals on compliance with a manda-
tory but poorly enforced fee for public broadcasting in Austria. Moral appeals
to pay the fee had a positive effect in municipalities where evasion was common.
Bott et al. (2017) find that when tax authorities in Norway included a moral ap-
peal in letters to potential tax avoiders, this on average doubled the self-reported
foreign income.
Taxpaying might not only imply a moral duty, but at the same time also a le-
gal obligation – even if the law is not enforced or when there are ways to legally
circumvent it. Framing behavior as “illegal” arguably gives strong behavioral
cues. In a lab experiment on tax paying, Blaufus et al. (2016) show that an
economically equivalent decision was treated differently when it was framed as
(admissible) tax avoidance versus (illegal) tax evasion. In the evasion scenario
tax minimization was less pronounced, but the differences vanished once pecu-
niary consequences were introduced. Tyran and Feld (2006), in a lab experiment,
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observed that exogenously imposed penalties did not raise cooperation when they
were non-deterrent.2 However, endogenously imposed sanctions did increase pro-
social behavior.3
Shaming. Abandoning anonymity in economic games has increasingly attracted
attention in recent years. In line with our results, most studies find large positive
effects on contributions, and attribute this to the fear of being publicly called out
and shamed for failing to cooperate.
In neutral Public Goods Games, e.g. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) used pictures to
make donors and their contributions identifiable to fellow group members. Such
visual identification led to significantly increased contributions to the public good.
Interestingly, donations were highest when disclosure was a deliberate choice.
Savihin Samek and Sheremeta (2014) displayed pictures plus names of participants
who contributed less than the maximum possible amount to a public good. They
observed significantly increased contributions resulting from this treatment. Rege
and Telle (2004) conducted a one-shot public goods game where participants could
constantly observe each other. This treatment significantly increased cooperation,
but Noussair and Tucker (2007) show that this effect is not upheld when the game
was played sequentially over 20 rounds. Bochet et al. (2006) dissolved anonymity
by allowing face-to-face communication and chat-boxes. Participants who met and
talked before the actual experiment started made significantly larger contributions
than the anonymous control group. In field experiments, Ariely et al. (2009)
and Ashraf et al. (2014) find that prosocial behavior increases considerably when
individual effort is displayed publicly, relative to a control condition where effort
remains private.
The effects of disclosure have also been studied in the context of tax evasion. Blau-
fus et al. (2017) and Casal and Mittone (2016) had public goods games played
without confidentiality in a tax evasion setting; not declaring the full endowment
2For a local church tax in Bavaria with historically zero audits and fines, Dwenger et al. (2016)
show that deterrence reduces tax evasion only by a fairly modest extent. Most tax payments
seem to be driven by duty-to-comply preferences.
3Drouvelis et al. (2015) used a word-search puzzle with words related to collective action to
prime cooperative behavior. In their public goods game, contributions among primed subjects
were around 11 percentage points higher than in the control group.
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(or income) was monetarily sanctioned if detected. Both studies find a positive
effect of the picture treatments on tax-declared income. Casal and Mittone (2016)
varied their experiment such that participants in one treatment got the option to
pay for remaining anonymous. This option was frequently used and led to more
abundant tax evasion. Fortin et al. (2007) and Coricelli et al. (2010) studied the
effect of disclosure on tax evasion without the inclusion of a public good. Both
studies find that disclosure led to significantly less tax evasion although such be-
havior did not harm others. Additionally, Coricelli et al. (2010) find that cheating
was accompanied by emotional arousal under the threat of being publicly revealed.
Alm et al. (2017), in a lab experiment on tax evasion without anonymity, distin-
guish between the decision to participate in tax evasion and between the amount
evaded. They find that shaming foremost deters participation in tax evasion, and
that shaming works regardless of differing social norms on compliance.
Our disclosure treatments also connect to “real-world” shaming practices : Dwenger
and Treber (2018) analyze a recently implemented naming-and-shaming policy in
Slovenia where tax delinquents (self-employed and corporations) were put on a
publicly available list. The authors show that the threat of being placed on this
list led to a reduction in tax debt by around 8.5%, whereas the effects of actually
being shamed were comparably marginal. Bø et al. (2016) exploit a policy change
in Norway in 2001, when information on tax returns became available on the in-
ternet. Following the policy change, reported taxable income increased by roughly
three percent. Since the effect was largest in densely populated areas, Bø et al.
(2016) conclude that it was driven mainly by the wish to avoid media attention or
public shaming. Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2015) find evidence for reduced tax
evasion in the US when tax delinquents were shamed by informing their neigh-
bors. Hasegawa et al. (2013) find that Japanese taxpayers close to a threshold
demanding for disclosure of individual tax returns systematically under-reported
income so as to avoid public disclosure.
Interacting non-pecuniary triggers. Our experiment complements a small
literature (albeit on distributive behavior) that disentangles and interacts different
behavioral motivations for pro-sociality. Dellavigna et al. (2012) find that for in-
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dividuals to make donations in a door-to-door fund-raising campaign, both moral
motives and social and (self-)image motives are in fact at work. This is in line
with what we find, too. Cappelen et al. (2017) study whether pro-social behavior,
in the form of giving in a dictator game, is motivated by (intrinsic) moral or by
(extrinsic) social motivation; the latter is manipulated by disclosing to recipients
whether or not their money comes from a subject in a dictator experiment. The
moral motivation is found to have a strong effect while the social motivation only
matters when a moral motive justifying the behavior pre-exists. Hence, while
social motivation is crowding-in with moral motivation, it becomes less relevant
when there is no underlying moral argument for sharing. Our findings (derived
in a tax compliance context) point into a different direction: social motivation
may be effective, but “name and shame”-programs targeting tax avoidance would
trump them.
3.3 Hypotheses
The previous section concluded that relying on simple moral appeals (e.g., stating
behavioral or “golden” rules) to steer behavior finds rather inconclusive support
in the literature. In our experiment we aim to frame reconsideration towards
the morality of pursuing personal gains in a way that goes beyond presenting
a straightforward behavioral rule. We combine the tax frame with a moralizing
mock “newspaper commentary” which should trigger an implicit (moral) duty
to comply when generally effective legal norms are not applicable. Without any
sanctions in place, we assume that there is still a strong incentive to free-ride.
Observing others’ noncompliance should corrupt moral obligations in the long
term:
Hypothesis I (Moral framing Effect): When framing non-cooperation as
morally debatable tax avoidance, contributions (or now, tax payments) will be
significantly higher than in the baseline setting. We do not, however, expect moral
framing to be binding.
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The literature review showed that the disclosure of non-cooperation led to sig-
nificantly increased contributions (tax payments) regardless of whether voluntary
contributions, tax evasion, or overdue tax payments were studied. Thus, in our
experiment, we predict that (the threat of) disclosing pictures and information on
individual’s failed cooperation to act as a social punishment: being called out –
and implicitly described as anti-social – reduces the temptation to reap personal
gains through free-riding.
Hypothesis II (Shaming Effect): When less-than-full compliance becomes
publicly known, contributions to the public good/tax payments will be significantly
higher than in the cases where decisions are not disclosed.
This mechanism should work both in the neutral and in the framed setting. In the
former case, free-riding means harming the group for personal gains. In the latter
setting, tax avoidance additionally means visibly breaking the unwritten call to
pay (all) taxes. Regardless of the scenario, we expect the differences between
non-disclosing and shaming treatments to be sizable and long-lasting. Some par-
ticipants might be ready to reveal themselves as free riders as the experiment goes
on, but we do not figure contagion to be as widespread as to make the shaming
effect disappear.
Our study is one of the first experiments that combines disclosure and moral fram-
ing. This shaming-moral framing interaction has different conceivable outcomes.
The (threat of) shaming could be stronger when cooperation is felt as a moral
duty that would be violated. Conversely, moral cues are perhaps more binding
when disclosure could harm participants’ reputation. For the combination of our
non-pecuniary triggers moral framing and shaming we expect the following:
Hypothesis III (Interaction Effect): Framing and shaming interact and in-
fluence each other. Specifically, we expect a positive interaction effect where the
concurrent presence of moral framing and shaming has a greater impact on con-
tributions than the two main effects alone.
47
CHAPTER 3. BRINGING TAX AVOIDERS TO LIGHT
3.4 Experimental Design
Our 2 × 2 experimental design consisted of a linear public goods game played
in four variants. Each variant drew on an identical contribution mechanism and
identical payoff functions: each participant was provided with an endowment of
E = 100 Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Of these 100 ECU, between zero
and 40 ECU could be invested into a productive public venture.4 The remaining
ECU were going to a private account that did not yield any returns.5 Groups
consisted of N = 5 members and were fixed in composition over the ten rounds
of the experiment.
Table 3.1: Experimental design
No disclosure Disclosure
Voluntary contribution Baseline Shaming
Tax avoidance Moral framing Moral framing×Shaming
The experimental payoffs for player i were pii = E − xi + gi, where xi ∈ [0, 40]
denotes the contribution to the public venture by player i and gi is player i’s payoff
from the public account. This return is given by gi = (γ/N)(xi+X−i), where X−i
is the sum of investments to the public good by the (four) other group members
except player i, and γ is an efficiency factor (rate of return) of the public good.
We chose γ = 1.5 in all treatments. The parameters described here resulted in
the payoff matrix depicted in the instructions (see Appendix 3.C).
The type of treatment depended on whether there was moral framing, disclosure of
low contributors, both, or none (baseline). This resulted in the 2×2 experimental
design sketched in Table 3.1.
4The choice was discrete and made in steps of 5 ECU.
5We use the 60:40 split to simulate a (maximum) tax rate of 40 percent in our framed experiments
(see below).
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Moral framing. In the treatments Moral framing and Moral framing×Shaming,
the public goods game was framed as a tax avoidance game with the moral loading
that taxes are actually meant to be paid. As a lesson from the extant literature on
the (in-)effectiveness of moral cues (see Section 3.2), we opted for a highly salient
framing that still leaves high liberties to individuals what to do and how to judge.
First, we altered the wording of the public goods game in the instructions. We re-
placed “endowment” by “taxable income” and “contribution” by “tax payments”.
The neutral option to invest up to 40 ECU into a profitable public project was
changed into a linear income tax of 40% that should be paid and would finance
a public project. Individuals had the option to reduce their personal tax burden
by choosing any lower tax rate than the 40% stipulated by the law. We explicitly
mentioned that this possibility was legal tax avoidance and not accompanied by
any monetary punishments.
To make participants consider the moral dimension of their choices we presented to
participants a short text on screen, laid out as a newspaper commentary.6 Under
the headline “Tax avoidance is legal, but can it ever be legitimate?”, the text
briefly defined tax avoidance as a legal way to reduce one’s personal tax burden
that might still not have been intended by the government. Thus, we insinuated
that tax avoiders would not act in the spirit of the law, even if they technically
did not violate it. Towards the end, we reminded readers that tax avoidance is a
personal decision; whether it was seen as socially justifiable was deliberately left to
participants’ own judgment. Figure A3.1 in Appendix 3.A shows the newspaper
commentary in German as well as its English translation.
Disclosure. After investment decisions, information on the own payment, the
sum of the investments in the group, and the individual payoff in the respective
round were presented to participants in all four variants of the game. In the
treatments Shaming and Moral framing×Shaming, this information was followed
by the photographs and the actual investment of those group members who con-
6The text was written by us, presenting a representative view of commentaries in German media
following the Panama Papers leak. Presenting an actual commentary would not have satisfied
this requirements, and even could have biased behavior by a specific political view of the media
outlet.
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tributed less than the possible 40 ECU or paid less than 40% taxes on their income.
All group members were provided with the same information. Full contributions
meant complete anonymity. That is, group members who did not free-ride were
never mentioned. Figure A3.2 in Appendix 3.A shows the disclosure screen. If all
group-members chose “40 ECU”, a note reporting this outcome was displayed on
the screen.
3.5 Experimental Protocol
The experiment was conducted at the computerized laboratory (LLEW) at the
Leibniz University Hannover in August and September 2017. Participants were
recruited from the general student population with the software hroot (Bock et
al., 2014). A total of 215 subjects (112 male, 102 female, one subject made no
statement) participated in the experiment. Earnings averaged around 11 Euro in
approximately one hour. Additionally, participants received a lump-sum show-up
fee of 4 Euro. We conducted 16 sessions and attempted to have 15 participants
(i.e. three groups of five) in each session of our four treatments. Since a few invited
students failed to show up, we ran three treatments with 10 participants in one
of the sessions (N per treatment was 55) and the Baseline with 10 participants in
two of the four sessions (N=50). The experiment was programmed with z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
Before the start of a session, one of the four treatments was randomly selected and
then played by all participants in that session. Subjects were randomly seated
and then matched (according to their seat number) to groups of five by the experi-
mental software. The participants’ photos were taken right before the instructions
(see Appendix 3.C) were handed out. To avoid differential expectational effects,
we took photos also in the two treatments where decisions would not be disclosed.
Participants gave written consent to shortly saving and potentially using their
photo in the experiment (Appendix 3.C). If a subject would not sign the consent
form, he or she was not permitted to participate but still received the show-up
fee. This only happened in one case.
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Before playing the experiment, participants had to answer a short computer-based
comprehension test (Appendix 3.C). In the treatments framed as a tax avoidance
game, the newspaper comment was presented to the subjects on-screen for two
and a half minutes before the first decisions were made.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of individual characteristics
Variable Mean Median Standard
deviation
Female 48%
Economics Major 21%
Bachelor degree 35%
Employed 36%
Tax declaration 62%
Age 24.18 24.00 4.62
Income 344.53 300.00 257.87
Semester 7.03 6.00 4.01
Notes: Total number of subjects is 215. “Economics Major” indi-
cates whether a subject studies economics or management. “Bach-
elor degree” takes the value of 1 if it is the subject’s highest educa-
tional degree. “Employed” indicates whether a participant holds a
job besides studying. “Tax declaration” takes the value of 1 if the
subject has at least once in life filed a tax declaration. “Income”
is monthly disposable income after deducting all fixed expenses.
After the last decision had been made in round 10, the payoff of one round was
randomly selected and paid in cash to the participants. Before payouts, we asked
participants to answer a short socioeconomic questionnaire. The subjects’ socio-
demographics are summarized in Table 3.2: Our sample is quite balanced between
female and male participants.7 A relatively low share of 21% of participants
was enrolled in an economics major program. 23% of the sample studied at the
department of philosophy, 19% in an engineering-related major, and 12% were
enrolled in a natural science program. With these numbers our sample represents
quite a good cross-section of the student population in Hannover.
7Summary statistics separated by treatment can be found in Table A3.1 in Appendix 3.B.
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3.6 Results
Our analysis focuses on two variables of interest: contributions to the public good
(tax payments, respectively) and the share of participants who are fully compliant,
i.e., who invest the maximum possible amount of 40 ECU into the public good.
While the latter variable may not be very informative in a pure VCM game without
disclosure, it becomes meaningful for the treatments. First, in the tax frame with
its implicit call for full compliance, the decision on how much taxes to pay could
be predated by a binary decision whether to avoid or not (see Alm et al. (2017) for
a related approach). Second, as we chose to disclose pictures as soon as a person
invests less than 40 ECU, full compliance is tantamount to keeping an untarnished
reputation.
3.6.1 Descriptive analysis and ANOVA
Contributions. In the baseline, contributions to the public good on average
amounted to 13.8 ECU over all rounds of the experiment. When pictures were
disclosed in the neutral setting, average contributions rose by 126% over baseline
to 31.3 ECU. With Moral framing, investments rose to 19.25 ECU, an increase
of almost 40% over baseline. In the joint Moral framing×Shaming treatment,
average tax payments were 31.1 ECU – an increase by 62% relative to Moral
framing, but no improvement over Shaming.
Figure 3.1 shows how average individual contributions (tax payments) developed
over time in the four treatments. In line with other public good games, partici-
pants contributed roughly half of what they could in the first three rounds of the
baseline. The average investments dropped by around 10 ECU in the last three
rounds, compared to the earlier stages. Overall, initial investments into the pub-
lic good were noticeably higher in the framed treatment without disclosure: with
Moral framing participants paid 65% of the due taxes in the first three rounds. In
the final rounds, tax payments decreased by 14 ECU, approaching the numbers
in the baseline.
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Figure 3.1: Contributions/tax payments over time.
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Between framed and unframed games with disclosure (solid lines), almost no dif-
ferences are visible. Over the first seven rounds, payments were relatively stable
at levels between 30 and 35 ECU. After round 7, contributions plummeted to
slightly above 20 ECU in the last round.
On average, 25% of participants in the treatment Moral framing fully paid their
taxes. This more than doubles the 12% reached in the baseline, where no moral
duty was implied. With disclosure of decisions, average full contributions/tax pay-
ments are again very similar with and without framing: 68% [69%] of participants
invested 40 ECU into the public good with Shaming [Moral framing×Shaming ],
which is a large increase over the baseline.8
ANOVA. In the first round of the experiment the 215 participants had no
information of their fellow group members’ decisions. Contributions in Round 1
8Figure A3.3 in Appendix 3.B shows time-series graphs for the share of full contributors in the
four treatments. Interestingly, 42% of the participants in the Moral framing treatment did
initially not cut their tax payments, although this would not have met with any consequences.
This is a strong increase over the 18% in the baseline. However, the differences disappear
almost completely in the last three rounds.
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can thus be treated as independent, allowing for an ANOVA on the individual
level as a first test towards the validity of our three hypotheses. In Round 1 we
find significant main effects for Moral framing (F (1, 211) = 4.25, p < .04) and
Shaming (F (1, 211) = 38.94, p < .001). We also find a significant interaction
between shaming and moral framing, the effect size (F (1, 211) = 6.81, p = .001)
lies above the framing main effect, but is trumped by the impact of shaming.
Because the sum of the main effects is clearly larger than the interaction effect,
we infer a negative interplay: shaming suppresses and dominates moral concerns.
Post-ANOVA regressions show that introducing moral framing led to an increase
in contributions (averaged over both states of disclosure) of 8.54 ECU (p = .001),
while shaming led to an average increase in contributions of 16.17 ECU (p < .001).
From Round 2 onwards, participants gathered information about others’ behavior.
Because individual decisions can no longer be assumed to be independent, we
report an ANOVA for the 43 independent groups in the experiment for rounds 2-
10. We generally confirm the result from round 1 and find significant main effects
(Moral framing: F (1, 383) = 5.48, p = .02; Shaming: F (1, 383) = 199.35, p <
.001) and the interaction effect (F (1, 383) = 6.03, p = .015).
To accommodate the fact that the size of the group account will be heavily in-
fluenced by observing others’ decisions, we also report post-estimation ANOVA
style tests of a mixed-effects linear regression for Rounds 2-10 with the 43 groups
as random intercepts. Now, the moral framing (χ2 = 1.07, p = .30) and the
interaction effect (χ2 = 1.25, p = .26) become insignificant. This could be seen
as a signal that perceived morality of behavior is strongly influenced by others’
actions. However, the threat of shaming proves to be an effective tool to enforce
cooperative behavior (χ2 = 33.59, p < .001). Over the experiment’s first three
rounds, framing (χ2 = 3.08, p = .08) and the interaction effect (χ2 = 2.87, p =
.09) are statistically significant.
Round effects. Not only the affiliation to a fixed group, but also the rounds
played in the experiment will likely influence participants’ decisions. We addi-
tionally ran a multilevel mixed effects model where we interacted moral framing,
disclosure, and their interaction with the rounds played in the experiment. We
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again use the 43 groups as random intercepts and report ANOVA-style hypothesis
tests. The time passed in the experiment itself (χ2 = 303.04, p < .001) and the
round-shaming interaction (χ2 = 15.42, p = .08) have a (large) impact on contri-
butions. The moral framing-round interaction as well as the triple interaction are
statistically insignificant.
Figure 3.2: Marginal effects of framing and shaming per round
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Black line with circle markers: disclosure (averaged for both states of framing). Gray line with
square markers: framing (averaged for both states of disclosure). 90% confidence intervals are
depicted.
Figure 3.2 is a graphical representation of these results. The rounds played in
the experiment have no significant impact on decisions in the framed treatments
(averaged over both states of disclosure), contributions decrease slightly over time
(gray line, square markers). Except for the experiment’s first three rounds, con-
tributions/tax payments in the disclosure treatments (black line, circle markers)
lie always above those in the framing-scenario. Interestingly, repeatedly observing
others’ behavior in the group led to increasing contributions/tax payments, peak-
ing in round 7. Only in the experiment’s last three rounds, cooperation declined.
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3.6.2 Multivariate analysis
Contributions/tax payments. In this section we report regression analyses
for our dependent variable Contribution, analyzing the separate treatment effects
(see Table 3.1). Using contributions as the dependent variable, we ran linear
random effects regressions with the subject ID as the cross-sectional variable and
the round number as the time variable. Specifically, the model is:
Contributionit = β0 +
3∑
k=1
βkTreatmenti + β4Roundt +
m∑
l=1
βlControlsi + εit + ui (3.1)
In Equation (3.1), contributions (tax payments) of subject i in round t depend
on the assignment to one of the four treatments. The Treatment variable takes a
value of 1 if a participant was either assigned to Moral framing, Shaming, or Moral
framing×Shaming. The Baseline is the reference category. Our treatment dum-
mies are complemented by control variables gathered from the questionnaire at
the end of the experiment. In Equation (3.1), ui is the subject-specific error term,
εit is the corresponding equation error term. To take the group-interdependencies
into account we cluster standard errors on the group-level in all specifications.
Column (1) of Table 3.3 only takes into account the treatment dummies. The
difference between baseline and Shaming is highly significant. The (threat of)
disclosure increased contributions by 17.52 ECU over baseline. From Table 3.3 we
cannot directly deduce the shaming effect in the tax avoidance setting. Therefore,
we report post-estimation Wald-Tests and show that shaming in the framed set-
ting has a highly significant and positive effect on contributions (null hypothesis:
Moral framing (Mf) = Moral framing×Shaming (Mf×S). The size of the effect is
17.31−5.45. Displaying pictures of tax avoiders leads to tax payments 11.86 ECU
higher than with moral framing. Column (2) introduces the socio-economic con-
trol variables (see Table 3.2). Only a few do significantly influence contributions.
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Table 3.3: Linear Random- and Mixed Effects Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE RE ME RE ME RE
Rounds (1-10) (1-10) (1-10) (1-3) (1-3) (8-10)
Moral framing 5.455 5.598∗ 5.218 7.586∗∗∗ 7.247∗∗ 2.372
(3.428) (3.100) (3.334) (2.895) (2.997) (3.019)
Shaming 17.52∗∗∗ 17.29∗∗∗ 16.48∗∗∗ 15.75∗∗∗ 15.40∗∗∗ 14.59∗∗∗
(3.394) (3.126) (3.453) (2.214) (2.326) (4.185)
M.framing×Shaming 17.31∗∗∗ 16.35∗∗∗ 16.97∗∗∗ 15.51∗∗∗ 15.66∗∗∗ 14.87∗∗∗
(3.444) (3.227) (3.464) (2.193) (2.268) (4.310)
Age 0.336∗ 0.141 0.342∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.304
(0.193) (0.155) (0.127) (0.114) (0.325)
Female −0.106 1.553 0.277 0.758 1.639
(1.591) (1.027) (1.592) (1.574) (2.141)
Employed −2.945∗∗ −2.490∗ −4.020∗∗ −3.484∗ −2.480
(1.445) (1.279) (1.697) (1.781) (1.988)
Taxes filed 0.034 −0.429 −0.469 −0.515 −0.594
(1.344) (1.123) (1.614) (1.603) (1.675)
Econ. Major −5.048∗∗∗ −4.069∗∗∗ −2.363 −1.923 −6.310∗∗∗
(1.906) (1.557) (2.102) (2.160) (2.261)
Bachelor 2.112∗ −0.521 2.506∗ 1.117 1.076
(1.188) (1.144) (1.300) (1.351) (1.654)
Semester 0.084 −0.034 0.027 −0.010 0.173
(0.208) (0.177) (0.199) (0.199) (0.275)
Income −0.006∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Round −1.584∗∗∗ −1.584∗∗∗ −0.386 −0.386 −2.600∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.157) (0.405) (0.401) (0.588)
Constant 13.80∗∗∗ 17.37∗∗∗ 23.33∗∗∗ 15.11∗∗∗ 17.39∗∗∗ 27.70∗∗∗
(2.384) (5.103) (4.988) (4.397) (4.508) (8.897)
Observations 2150 2010 2010 603 603 603
N 215 201 201 201
R2-within 0 0.169 0.002 0.059
R2-between 0.352 0.398 0.320 0.272
R2 0.201 0.298 0.240 0.218
Wald-Tests
S = Mf p<.001 p<.001 p=.002 p=.003 p=.004 p=.003
Mf = Mf×S p<.001 p=.002 p=.001 p=.004 p=.003 p=.003
S = Mf×S p=.952 p=.783 p=.894 p=.906 p=.896 p=.957
Notes: The dependent variable is the contribution to the public good/tax payment, measured
in discrete steps of 5, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 40. Reference is the Baseline. See
Table 3.2 for a description of the socio-economic covariates. Some participants did not provide
answers for some of the questions. This results in a loss of 14 observations. RE: Random
Effects; ME: Mixed Effects. Standard errors, clustered on the group-level, are in parentheses.
Wald-Tests are reported. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
57
CHAPTER 3. BRINGING TAX AVOIDERS TO LIGHT
Being employed as well as studying economics leads to significantly less cooper-
ative behavior, older participants contributed significantly more.9 Contributions
with Moral framing are around 5.6 ECU higher (and statistically significant in
column (2)) compared to the Baseline.
Column (3) of Table 3.3 estimates a mixed effects model of specification (2) to
further (beyond clustering standard errors) account for the influence of observing
in-group behavior. The coefficients’ magnitude is slightly reduced, while, except
for Moral framing and Age, statistical significance remains unchanged.
Models (4) and (5) of Table 3.3 analyze only the experiment’s first three rounds.
In the early stages, Moral framing has a highly significant effect on Contributions,
and the effect size is larger than over all 10 rounds. In the experiment’s first phase,
the rounds played had no effect on contributions, unlike over all 10 rounds. Com-
paring random-and mixed effects reveals almost no differences.10 Lastly, column
(6) shows a random effects regression for the experiment’s last three rounds. As
expected, simply framing and morally loading tax avoidance becomes “useless”.
Full compliance. Our second dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a sub-
ject invested the maximum possible amount of 40 ECU into the public good and
else zero. The variable’s binary character allows for a non-linear probit regression
model in Eq. (3.1) and thus to estimate the increase in the likelihood of becoming
“fully compliant”, conditional on being confronted with moral framing, shaming,
or both. Because coefficients in nonlinear models cannot be meaningfully inter-
preted, we report partial effects in Table 3.4.
Model (1) of Table 3.4 shows the baseline results for all 10 rounds. Without
disclosure we find a significant moral framing effect. Deciding about tax avoidance
increases the likelihood of full compliance (paying 40 ECU) by 16.8 percentage
9As an additional test we excluded the 43 always-compliers (investment of 40 ECU in all 10
rounds) from our sample to explore only the behavior of (potential) non-compliers. This change
left statistical significance unchanged, predicted contributions in the disclosure treatments de-
creased by 2 ECU (not reported in the Table).
10In Table A3.4 in Appendix 3.B the treatment-coefficients are interacted with the round mea-
sure. The results show that the progressing time in the experiment only exerts a significant
downward pull on contributions in the Moral framing×Shaming treatment.
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Table 3.4: Probit Regressions for Full Compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE RE ME RE ME RE
Rounds (1-10) (1-10) (1-10) (1-3) (1-3) (8-10)
Moral framing 0.168∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.057
(0.083) (0.076) (0.078) (0.076) (0.082) (0.073)
Shaming 0.508∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.075) (0.079) (0.063) (0.065) (0.084)
M.framing× Shaming 0.530∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.061) (0.062) (0.085)
Age 0.009∗ 0.005 0.014∗ 0.012∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Female −0.023 0.028 0.011 0.040 0.0
(0.045) (0.039) (0.057) (0.059) (0.047)
Employment −0.058 −0.051 −0.076 −0.064 −0.051
(0.042) (0.034) (0.051) (0.052) (0.055)
Taxes filed −0.016 −0.044 −0.045 −0.047 −0.001
(0.040) (0.044) (0.055) (0.054) (0.045)
Econ. Major −0.053 −0.045 0.004 0.003 −0.103
(0.049) (0.039) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060)
Bachelor 0.044 −0.025 0.036 −0.004 0.013
(0.035) (0.032) (0.046) (0.047) (0.043)
Semester 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Income −0 ∗ ∗ −0 ∗ ∗ −0 ∗ ∗ −0∗ −0.001∗
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Round −0.031∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.029∗ −0.028 −0.053∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015)
Observations 2, 150 2, 010 2, 010 603 603 603
Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if whenever a subject chose to invest 40 ECU
(40% of her endowment) to the public investment. Marginal effects are reported. Standard
errors, clustered on the group-level, are in parentheses. See Table 3.2 for the description of the
socio-economic covariates. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
points, compared to a voluntary contribution.11
Shaming has not only a large effect on contributions, but also on the likelihood of
investing the maximum possible share of the endowment. In the neutral context,
disclosing pictures and information on decisions increases the probability of full
compliance by around 51 percentage points. The effect size of adding shaming
to our moral frame is 0.53 − 0.168 = 0.362 (thus, 36.2 percentage points) and is
highly significant (Wald-Test, not reported).
Adding controls, column (2) of Table 3.4 shows that the treatment effects re-
main very similar compared to specification (1). Of the socio-economic controls,
11Since both the dependent variable and the treatment dummies are binary, we get an increase
in percentage points. For continuous variables, we measure an increase in %.
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only Age has a statistically significant impact. Column (4) shows that the pure
framing-effect in the experiment’s first three rounds was markedly higher com-
pared to all 10 rounds, while the differences for Shaming and Moral framing×
Shaming are much smaller. In the last three rounds (column (6) of Table 3.4),
the likelihood of becoming a full complier becomes insignificant with only moral
framing.
Columns (3) and (5) of Table 3.4 show mixed effects probit regressions as an
additional robustness checks. As in Table 3.3, effect sizes tend to decrease slightly,
leaving statistical significance largely unchanged.
3.6.3 Framing and shaming without moral loading
Our findings so far show a positive (yet transitory) effect of framing a lack of
cooperation as morally debatable tax avoidance. While being a fitting represen-
tation of the media response to the tax leaks described in the Introduction, our
approach combined framing and a moral appeal. To separate and disentangle
these manipulations we report results from two additional treatments with a to-
tal of 85 participants where we used the tax frame without moral loading, both
with (Framing×Shaming, N=45) and without (Framing, N=40) disclosure of
tax payments. The six additional sessions were conducted at the computerized
laboratory (LLEW) at the Leibniz University Hannover in February 2019, the
procedure followed the description in Section 3.5.12
Statistical tests. A first objection concerning our framing manipulation might
be that the introduction of the tax context alone could suffice to raise coopera-
tion above baseline, making moral loading less effective. This argument can be
rejected. Contributions in the baseline (13.8 ECU) and the Framing treatment
(14.0 ECU) are almost identical (p=.775, Mann-Whitney U -test). This result
holds for the experiment’s first three, five, and the last three rounds as well as for
the share of full compliers (16% for the simple tax frame).
12For summary statistics of the new sample see Table A3.2 in Appendix 3.B.
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Secondly, for cooperation in the experiment it might not matter whether tax
avoidance is morally loaded. This concern can also be rejected. Except for the last
three rounds, tax payments were significantly higher (p < .001, Mann-Whitney
U -test) when the morality of tax avoidance was questioned in the newspaper
commentary (19.25 ECU). For the share of full compliers this only applies in the
experiment’s first three rounds.
With disclosure of decisions we find that shaming is significantly less marked
without moral loading. With 22.2 ECU, tax payments are around 9 ECU lower
(p < .001, Mann-Whitney U -test) compared to both the Moral framing× Shaming
and the Shaming treatment. The share of full compliers with moral loading is
27 percentage points above the 42% in the simple framing context. Shaming
tax avoiders without informing about moral concerns has no lasting effect on tax
payments. Differences in cooperativeness are statistically inseparable only in the
experiment’s first round.13 Table A3.3 in Appendix 3.B shows random, mixed,
and probit regressions for the two additional treatments; differences between Moral
Framing and Framing×Shaming are not statistically significant (Wald-test).
ANOVA with the simple tax framing as the Baseline. Following the
steps from the ANOVA in Section 3.6.1, for the first round (individual level)
we find a significant main effect for the moral appeal (F (1,191)=4.06, p=.045),
which is again outperformed by the threat of disclosing decisions (F (1,191)=19.92,
p < .001). The Moral framing×Shaming interaction is not statistically significant
(F (1,191)=1.35, p=.247).
Over the last nine rounds (group-level), the interaction effect is significant (F (1,347)
= 4.1, p=.044), but pales against the impact of moral framing (F (1.347)=38.37,
p <.001) and shaming (F (1,347)=72.97, p < .001). When controlling for the in-
fluence of others’ behavior from round 2 onwards, post-estimation ANOVA-style
hypothesis tests of a mixed-effects regression confirm the main effect of moral
loading (χ2=6.11, p=.014) and shaming (χ2=11.61, p < .001). The interaction
effect is not significant (χ2=.65, p=.419).
13Graphs on the development of tax payments over time can be found in Figures A3.4 and A3.5
in Appendix 3.B.
61
CHAPTER 3. BRINGING TAX AVOIDERS TO LIGHT
Controlling for the influence of time passing in the experiment on decisions by
participants returns only a significant effect for the moral appeal-shaming inter-
action (χ2=17.71, p=.039) and the Round measure itself (χ2=244.87, p < .001).
Interacting Moral framing × Shaming with the progressing time in the experiment
is extraneous for participants’ tax payments.
3.6.4 Leaders and Holdouts
How does observing widespread cooperation or rampant non-compliance affect
contributions to the public good within groups? To explore this question we
identify “Leaders” as subjects who always fully contributed in the experiment’s
first three rounds, setting a “good” example. Conversely, subjects who chose a
consistent strategy of no cooperation (sum of contributions ≤45 ECU in rounds
1-3) are defined as “Holdouts”.14
Table 3.5: Distribution of leaders and holdouts (% of subjects)
Baseline Moral
framing
Shaming Moral
framing ×
Shaming
Framing Framing×
Shaming
Leaders 10.00 25.45 61.82 63.64 7.50 37.78
Holdouts 44.00 18.18 5.45 5.45 50.00 11.11
Table 3.5 shows that more than 60% of participants were fully compliant in the
initial 2×2 shaming treatments. With the tax frame but without moral loading
this number drops by around 25 percentage points. In the Baseline and the
simple tax-frame treatment full compliance is a rare occasion, while about half
of participants chose an uncooperative strategy in the first three rounds. With
moral framing, the gap between Leaders and Holdouts is markedly smaller.
Table 3.6 shows the distribution of groups where the number of Leaders out-
weighed the number of Holdouts and vice versa. In the Shaming and Moral
framing×Shaming treatments, 91% of groups were led by a majority of good
example setters. In the Baseline and with simple framing, the distribution of
Holdouts and Leaders is flipped. With Moral framing participants seemed to be
14This approach follows Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and their analysis of “leaders” and “lag-
gards”.
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quite torn between compliance and self-interest. In the disclosure treatment with-
out morally loaded tax avoidance, one third of the groups had an equal number
of Leaders and Holdouts in the experiment’s first three rounds.
Table 3.6: Distribution of Leaders and Holdouts (% of Groups)
Baseline Moral
framing
Shaming Moral
framing ×
Shaming
Framing Framing×
Shaming
More leaders 10 54.55 90.91 90.91 12.5 55.56
More holdouts 80 36.36 9.09 0 87.5 11.11
If numbers do not add up to a 100%, Leaders and Holdouts in a group were equally distributed.
Table 3.7 shows the share of Followers fully contributing to the public good after
round 3. Table 3.7 also analyzes Followers’ behavior separately for groups with
more Leaders/more Followers and thus provides answers for the most interesting
question: how does the strength of Leaders and Holdouts and their observed
behavior in the group influence the decisions of participants who did not pursue
a clear strategy in the first three rounds?
Table 3.7: Share of followers fully contributing to the public good
Baseline Moral
framing
Shaming Moral
framing ×
Shaming
Framing Framing×
Shaming
More leaders 4.76 20 45.92 52.04 42.86 38.57
More holdouts 1.68 3.30 14.29 – 14.29 0
p-value .546 .001 .003 < .001 .009 < .001
Significance across the three classifications is tested with the Kruskal-Wallis test.
The behavior of these “Followers” is significantly influenced by the dominant
strategy in a group. From round 4 onwards, around half of the Followers fully
contributed to the public good in those treatments where the groups with more
Leaders constituted the vast majority. In the treatments where Holdouts gen-
erally outweighed the Leaders, full compliance was a rare event. Especially in
the disclosure treatments being grouped with a majority of holdouts is associated
with a breakdown of (full) compliance. Shaming is only present in groups where
a majority of participants abide by the implicit rule of full contributions.
The simple tax avoidance setting (without moral cues) reveals a very interesting
result. While in almost all groups holdouts represented the majority, the rare
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occasion of more leaders led to full compliance comparable to the shaming treat-
ments. Perhaps, the observed high-compliance in the group was then understood
as a duty or norm to also pay all taxes formed by the Leaders instead of being
triggered by the newspaper commentary.
Whenever disclosure of decisions loomed, the Leaders remained very compliant
also after round 3 (around 80% full contributions). In the framing treatments
this number drops to around 36% percent, and plummets when Leaders faced a
majority of Holdouts in their group. In the Moral framing×Shaming treatment
on average 36% of Holdouts fully contributed (after round 3) when they were
members of a group with a majority of Leaders (not reported in Tables).
3.6.5 Interpretation
In two of our four initial treatments, free-riding on the public good was private in-
formation and not bound with any consequences. The only change was to present
the contribution mechanism in a different, morally loaded, context. With tax
avoidance we find investments into the public good to be significantly higher, the
share of full-contributors even twice as high as in the Baseline. This difference
could be attributed to the implicit rule of taxpaying as a moral duty. Without
moral framing, contributions indicate to the pure attitude towards pro-social (co-
operative) behavior, which is not only very volatile, but also less pronounced than
in the case where contributions are presented as an institutionalized service to the
community and as a moral duty. However, with no enforcement or sanctioning
mechanism in place, framing a decision as legal but morally ambiguous does not
stabilize persistently high levels of cooperation. Customization and the observed
free-riding on behalf of other group members (Section 3.6.4) eventually erodes the
rule of taxpaying as a duty.
Section 3.6.3 shows that the newspaper commentary, activating deliberation about
the moral aspects of tax avoidance rather than invoking direct behavioral rules,
plays a crucial role here. Without moral loading, tax payments are identical to
contributions in the baseline and significantly smaller than with moral framing.
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In our disclosure treatments we name tax avoiders (non-contributors) by publish-
ing their pictures and information on their payments. The results demonstrate
that social pressure cannot only significantly increase cooperative behavior but
can also make it persistent; free-riding is eliminated to a large degree.15 In line
with the literature, we attribute this effect to the anticipation of shaming (the
feeling of being blamed by others), which individuals typically want to avoid. In
the framed context, we interpret shaming as arising from visibly and recogniz-
ably violating the imperative of tax compliance. Interestingly, shaming is less
pronounced (also in comparison with the neutral context) when there is no in-
dication towards the immorality and harmfulness of tax avoidance. Table 3.7
indicates that in the Framing×Shaming treatment a smaller share of participants
set out a good example. Tax compliance was not a strong implicit rule and con-
sequentially the “Followers” were less reluctant to avoid, too. This can perhaps
be interpreted as a sign that the term “tax” itself has a lesser moral connotation
than a voluntary “contribution”. Making the moral dimension salient can change
this, but is short-lived without revealing non-compliance.
Framing and shaming also interact with and depend on each other. However, this
interdependency mainly works in one direction; when threatened with disclosure,
decisions in the neutral and the framed context became almost indistinguishable.
We interpret this as follows: subjects in all initial treatments were aware of the
social benefit of making high (or even full) contributions and of the material con-
sequences resulting from free-riding. Without framing the voluntary contribution
as a moral duty, however, there is no incentive to forgo individual gains. With
shaming as a non-monetary sanction, participants are, as in the tax-avoidance
scenario, not willing to be revealed as cheap profiteers. Without a social sanction
in place, reflecting on the “right or wrong” of one’s behavior plays a role, but it
is much less binding than shaming.
15In the disclosure treatments cooperation drops in the last three rounds but remains signifi-
cantly above the baseline and the framing treatments. Participants were aware that the ex-
periment lasted 10 rounds. Thus, the drop in contributions could be the result of last round(s)
effects. Yet, we cannot rule out that the shaming effects might vanish if the experiment had
lasted 15 or 20 rounds.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
Our experiment tests and interacts two mechanisms that, in principle, help to
promote pro-social behavior when pecuniary incentives (rewards or fines) or legal
enforcement are not available: moral framing and shaming.
We, first, show that framing subjects into a specific setting with an implicit moral
duty to cooperate leads to increased investments into a public good: participants
are less likely to free-ride when they decide in the context of an legally admissible
yet socially reprehensible behavior. However, without any enforcement such a
behavioral standard might eventually erode quickly. We, second, show that social
control (fear of being shamed) can significantly reduce free-riding and perhaps even
stabilize cooperation: the fear of being blamed for selfish and socially irresponsible
behavior is great – and, as our third result, even great enough to make cues to
moral issues superfluous to steer individual decisions.
With our experimental design we cleanly identify the shaming effect since, in con-
trast to research on illegal behavior, the effect of disclosure is not confounded with
elements of deterrence or strategical concerns resulting from the (moderate) risk
of getting caught. Transferring our results to policy debates, the significant role
of public exposure suggests that (the threat) of disclosing unwarranted behavior
is an effective strategy for reducing tax avoidance and, more generally, promoting
pro-social behavior. The communication of moral arguments also works – but less
effectively and, once a shaming mechanism is in place, without noticeable effect.
In our experiment, shaming leaves subjects better off in terms of monetary payoffs.
This does not imply, however, that the high social pressure it obviously induces is
welfare-increasing in general (also see Dellavigna et al., 2012, for a related point).
Moreover, pillorying could be questionable outside the lab and would quickly col-
lide with concerns about privacy and human rights, especially when it sets in at
the slightest incidence of wrong-doing. Concerning real-world equivalents, how-
ever, the concept of (institutionalized) shaming has recently received heightened
attention in the context of taxation. Our results from the lab affirm the general
(if transitory) efficacy of such measures. Whether such gains can outweigh the
cost of the pillory obviously is a question that cannot be answered in a laboratory.
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Appendices Chapter 3
3.A Screen messages
Newspaper article
Figure A3.1: Newspaper commentary
As presented to participants on screen prior to Round 1.
English translation:
“Tax avoidance is legal, but can it be legitimate?
In the recent past, whistle-blowers have uncovered large-scale tax avoidance. It
not only involves large multinational corporations but also thousands of individual
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taxpayers who use shell companies to hide income or assets from national tax
authorities. Generally, these tax practices are lawful; no legal consequences are
looming.
Primarily, tax avoidance is not a matter of wrongdoing in any legal sense. It
is more a matter of morality in an economic system where capital flows know
no boundaries while taxation is still chained to nation states. Does a taxpayer
behave ethically when he cherishes public funding for universities, infrastructure,
or the police but considers the state as an opponent as soon as funding affects his
own purse?
Tax avoidance means bypassing the law with legal means. Tax avoiders might
not violate tax laws directly – but they do not act in its spirit either. Moreover,
tax avoiders undermine the very integrity of the tax system since the adopted tax
strategy was neither wanted nor intended by the law-maker.
Every taxpayer with an opportunity to avoid taxes faces the personal choice
whether he or she can make tax avoidance seem right - for himself/herself and
for others. This choice, however, should be made with bearing the societal conse-
quences in mind: tax avoidance leads to lesser government revenues and, thus, to
fewer public services and a more unjust distribution of the tax burden.
Not everything that is legal is also legitimate.”
Differences in on-screen messages
The wording of the disclosure texts was slightly adjusted between neutral and
framed treatments. In the Shaming treatment a message read “On the next
page, those group members who contributed less than the maximum possible
amount to the public good will be publicly disclosed”. It was modified in the
treatment Moral framing×Shaming to: “On the next page, those group members
who paid less taxes than scheduled will be publicly disclosed by their picture
and their respective tax payment. Due to the reduction of the individual tax
burden, tax revenues decrease to the detriment of the whole group.” In the framed
disclosure treatment without the moral appeal (Moral framing×Shaming), the last
moralizing sentence was not presented to the participants.
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Disclosure screen
Figure A3.2: Disclosure screen with pictures and payment informa-
tion
In this sample picture, group members 1, 3, and 5 avoid taxes. Their pictures, together with
information about their tax payment are disclosed to all group members. Group members
2 and 4 did not avoid taxes and thus remain anonymous. The headline reads “The following
group members have reduced their personal tax burden. Doing so is legal and not connected with
monetary consequences”. In the non-framed experiment, the message read “The following group
members contributed less than the maximum possible amount of 40 ECU.” The pictures do not
show actual participants. The photos were retrieved from the website pexels.com, which provides
free stock photos with a CC0 (Creative Commons Zero) license for private and commercial use.
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3.B Additional tables and figures
Table A3.1: Summary statistics of socioeconomic items by 2×2 treat-
ment
Variable Baseline Shaming Moral framing Moral framing
× Shaming
Female 44% 55% 44% 47%
Economics Major 24% 25% 20% 15%
Bachelor degree 40% 29% 35% 36%
Employed 38% 35% 44% 28%
Tax declaration 72% 56% 69% 53%
Age 24.29 23.94 23.96 24.54
[23] [24] [24] [24]
(3.07) (3.12) (2.57) (7.64)
Income 299.85 341.64 321.98 409.72
[300] [300] [300] [355]
(225.31) (248.03) (253.24) (285.91)
Semester 7.06 6.51 7.09 7.45
[6] [6] [7] [6]
(4.41) (3.7) (3.14) (4.64)
Notes: Number of subjects in Baseline is 50. Number of subjects in the three treatments is each
55. See Table 3.2 for a description of the variables.
Table A3.2: Summary statistics of individual characteristics, sample
extension
Variable Mean Median Standard
devia-
tion
Female 51%
Economics Major 18%
Bachelor degree 47%
Employed 31%
Tax declaration 60%
Age 24.28 23.00 2.97
Income 354.83 300.00 245.02
Semester 7.58 7.00 4.01
N=85; 40 participants in treatment framing, 45 participants in treatment framing×shaming.
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Table A3.3: Multivariate analysis for all treatments (Baseline is the
reference category)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE ME RE ME Probit Probit
Rounds (1-10) (1-10) (1-3) (1-3) (1-10) (1-3)
Moral Framing 5.457∗ 5.198 7.550∗∗ 7.262∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(3.226) (3.355) (2.986) (3.041) (0.077) (0.081)
Shaming 17.10∗∗∗ 16.53∗∗∗ 15.82∗∗∗ 15.55∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(3.144) (3.403) (2.276) (2.353) (0.079) (0.072)
Moral Framing×Shaming 16.35∗∗∗ 16.91∗∗∗ 15.71∗∗∗ 15.74∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗
(3.305) (3.438) (2.272) (2.316) (0.083) (0.069)
Framing 0.014 0.168 −1.357 −1.320 0.057 0.050
(2.811) (2.940) (2.714) (2.771) (0.070) (0.073)
Framing×Shaming 8.435∗∗ 7.876∗∗ 10.10∗∗∗ 9.88∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
(3.918) (4.030) (2.500) (2.531) (0.095) (0.076)
Age 0.358∗ 0.073 0.285∗∗ 0.146 0.009∗ 0.010∗
(0.188) (0.143) (0.114) (0.114) (0.005) (0.006)
Female −1.418 0.449 −0.703 −0.277 −0.073∗∗ −0.048
(1.239) (0.916) (1.303) (1.330) (0.036) (0.047)
Semester −0.033 −0.210 −0.097 −0.181 0.005 0.004
(0.189) (0.164) (0.188) (0.194) (0.005) (0.006)
Econ. Major −4.485∗∗ −4.233∗∗∗ −3.006∗ −2.954 −0.050 −0.022
(1.774) (1.441) (1.788) (1.812) (0.048) (0.053)
Bachelor 0.690 0.959 2.146 2.041 0.017 0.016
(1.288) (1.276) (1.331) (1.419) (0.037) (0.045)
Income −0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.0 ∗ ∗ −0.0 ∗ ∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0) (0)
Employed −2.924∗∗ −1.833∗ −3.654∗∗∗ −3.047∗∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.108∗∗
(1.244) (1.087) (1.351) (1.438) (0.036) (0.045)
Taxes filed −0.929 −1.667∗ −0.329 −0.560 −0.019 −0.017
(1.128) (0.955) (1.367) (1.316) (0.034) (0.045)
Round −1.563∗∗∗ −1.563∗∗∗ −1.290∗∗∗ −1.290∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.138) (0.419) (0.416) (0.003) (0.015)
Observations 2, 810 2, 810 843 843 2, 810 843
Wald-Tests (p =)
Framing = Moral Framing .074 .112 .006 .008 .046 .007
Moral F.× S. = F.×Shaming .051 .030 .012 .009 .040 .015
Moral F. = Framing× Shaming .463 .518 .390 .382 .126 .280
Framing = Framing× Shaming .023 .044 <.001 <.001 .002 <.001
Notes: Specifications (1)-(4): the dependent variable are the discrete Contributions to the
public good. Specifications (5) and (6): nonlinear regressions with the binary variable Full
Compliance as the dependent variable. Marginal effects are reported for the Probit models.
RE: linear random effects; ME: linear mixed effects. Wald-Tests are reported. For a description
of the socio-economic variables see Table ??. Standard errors, clustered on the group-level, are
in parentheses. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
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Table A3.4: Interacting Treatment and Round Effects
(1) (2) (3)
RE RE Probit
Moral Framing 8.963∗∗ 9.212∗∗∗ 1.481∗∗∗
(3.787) (3.542) (0.450)
Shaming 18.21∗∗∗ 17.96∗∗∗ 3.198∗∗∗
(2.670) (2.401) (0.533)
Moral Framing×Shaming 17.06∗∗∗ 16.40∗∗∗ 3.067∗∗∗
(2.630) (2.539) (0.515)
Framing −0.265 −0.678 0.227
(3.514) (3.135) (0.439)
Framing×Shaming 11.48∗∗∗ 10.74∗∗∗ 1.923∗∗∗
(2.917) (2.751) (0.420)
Round −1.359∗∗∗ −1.364∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.204) (0.043)
Round×
Moral Framing −0.638∗∗ −0.683∗∗ −0.088
(0.301) (0.291) (0.057)
Shaming −0.126 −0.156 −0.033
(0.364) (0.364) (0.054)
Moral Framing×Shaming 0.045 −0.008 0.0
(0.450) (0.471) (0.067)
Framing 0.121 0.126 0.023
(0.415) (0.417) (0.068)
Framing×Shaming −0.554 −0.418 −0.012
(0.483) (0.464) (0.058)
Age 0.358∗ 0.053∗
(0.188) (0.029)
Female −1.433 −0.429∗∗
(1.240) (0.217)
Employed −2.924∗∗ −0.432∗∗
(1.245) (0.219)
Taxes filed −0.929 −0.110
(1.129) (0.198)
Econ. Major −4.485∗∗ −0.294
(1.775) (0.281)
Bachelor 0.690 0.105
(1.289) (0.218)
Semester −0.033 0.028
(0.189) (0.031)
Income −0.008∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.002) (0)
N 3000 2810 2810
Number of Subjects 300 281 281
Notes: RE: linear random effects. Coefficients are reported for the probit regression. Standard
errors, clustered on the group level, are in parentheses. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
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Figure A3.3: Share of full contributors
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Notes: Dashed gray line: Baseline; solid black line: Shaming; dashed black line: Moral framing;
solid black line: Moral framing×Shaming.
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Figure A3.4: Contributions/tax payments over time
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Figure A3.5: Share of full contributors over time
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3.C Instructions
Instructions given to the participants in the experiments were originally in Ger-
man. This Appendix presents their English translation. Distinct instructions were
prepared for each experiment. In the following, the different versions are combined,
with variations between treatments being marked by square brackets.
General Information [common to all treatments]
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. Upon completion of the ex-
periment you will receive a participation fee of 4 euros. This fee is independent of
the experiment’s events. In the experiment you have the chance to earn additional
money. The amount will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of your
fellow players. The total payoff constitutes of your earnings in the experiment
plus the participation-fee. Today’s experiment consists of a total of 10 rounds.
Please observe the following:
• Please read the instructions thoroughly. If you do not understand certain
aspects, do not hesitate to ask. However, do not ask your question audibly.
Instead, please raise your hand.
• Seats are provided with a visual cover. Verbal communication with fellow
participants is not permitted. You also must not leave your seat.
• Please turn off your mobile phone or other electronic devices and store them
in your bag.
• The pencil on your desk can be used. On the instructions, you may make
markings or take notes.
• The program with which the experiment is carried out must not be closed.
Please do not open any other programs on the computer.
• Standby times might occur because participants proceed at different speeds.
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• At the end of the experiment with a total of 10 rounds, one of the rounds
will be randomly selected for your payout (in cash).
• You will receive your total earnings at the end of the experiment. Please
return the instructions to the experimenter.
Proceedings
In the experiment you will be part of a group consisting of exactly 5 group mem-
bers. The composition of the group is fixed over the course of the experiment.
The 10 rounds are independent.
Initial endowment and decision [Baseline, Shaming] In each of the 10
rounds, you (and each member of your group) have an endowment of 100 ECU
(Experimental Currency Unit) at your disposal. Of the 100 ECU, a maximum
of 40 ECU can be invested in a profitable public venture. However, you can also
decide to invest less or nothing at all. Depending on your decision, at least 60
ECU and maximum 100 ECU go to a private account which does not yield profits.
The exchange rate from ECU to euro is 1:10, i.e., 10 ECU equals 1 euro.
Initial endowment and decision [Framing, Moral framing, Framing×
Shaming, Moral framing×Shaming] In each of the 10 rounds, you (and
each member of your group) are endowed with a taxable income of 100 ECU
(Experimental Currency Unit). The linear tax rate is 40%, that is, you have to
pay 40 ECU taxes. Your tax payment and the taxes of your fellow group members
will be invested in a profitable public venture.
However, you have the legal possibility to reduce your individual tax burden: in
each round of the experiment, you decide how much tax you pay. This simultane-
ously determines the rate with which your endowment is taxed. If you do not use
the possibility to reduce your tax burden, the tax rate remains at the scheduled
40%. Reducing the tax burden is legal and, thus, not connected to any monetary
sanctions. Depending on your decision, at least 60 ECU and maximum 100 ECU
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go to a private account which does not yield profits. The exchange rate from ECU
to euro is 1:10, i.e., 10 ECU equals 1 euro.
Earnings and payoffs
[Baseline, Shaming:] Revenues from the public venture depend on the contribu-
tions of all group members. The following applies: the more a group member
contributes, the higher the returns for each group member.
[Framing, Moral framing, Framing×Shaming, Moral framing×Shaming] Revenues
from the public venture depend on the tax payments of all group members. The
following applies: the more taxes a group member pays, the higher the returns
for each group member.
Payoffs in each round emerge as follows:
Payoffs = Stock of private account + revenue from the public venture.
Table 1 [here: Figure A3.6] exemplifies some payoffs, conditional on your own
contribution and the contributions of the other four group members.
Please note:
• [in Baseline, Shaming::] For simplicity, you cannot select an arbitrary contri-
bution between 0 and 40 ECU. You choose from the series of values depicted
on your screen.
• [in Framing, Moral framing, Framing×Shaming, Moral framing×Shaming:]
For simplicity, you cannot select an arbitrary tax payment between 0 and 40
ECU. You choose from the series of tax payments depicted on your screen.
• [in Baseline, Framing, Moral framing:] Your decision about your contribu-
tion [tax payment, treatments Framing, Moral framing] will not be disclosed.
The group members will not learn how much you invested into the public
venture.
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Figure A3.6: Payoff table
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• [in treatments Shaming, Framing×Shaming, Moral framing×Shaming:] Your
decision about your contribution [tax payment, Framing×Shaming, Moral
framing×Shaming] will be disclosed. The group members will learn how
much you invested into the public venture.
Information at the end of any round
After each group member has decided about their own contribution [tax payment],
your individual contribution [tax payment], the total group contributions [tax
revenue] and your personal payoff in the respective round will be displayed to you
on your screen.
[Addendum for treatment Shaming:] Additionally, those group members who in-
vested less than 40 ECU to the public venture will be disclosed at the end of each
round. In this case, the picture and the contribution of the respective group mem-
bers will be presented to all group members. Who contributes the full amount
will remain anonymous.
[Addendum for treatments Framing×Shaming, Moral framing×Shaming:] Addi-
tionally, those group members who paid less than the scheduled 40 ECU taxes
will be disclosed at the end of each round. In this case, the picture and the tax
payment of the respective group members will be presented to all group members.
Who did not reduce the individual tax burden will remain anonymous.
Final Information [common to all treatments]
After reading these instructions we ask you to answer some questions on your
computer. Answering these questions only checks comprehension and is not rele-
vant for payoffs. The experiment will start upon completion of the comprehension
test.
After the experiment we ask you to answer a few questions. For this purpose a
short questionnaire will start automatically. The questionnaire is not relevant
for payoffs either. [Added in treatments Shaming, Framing×Shaming, Moral
framing×Shaming: The answers will not be disclosed.]
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Declaration of consent
For today’s experiment it is necessary to take your picture and to save it digitally
for a short time. Dependent on the events in the experiment it might happen that
your photography is presented to you and other participants on screen.
Upon completion of the experiment your photo will be deleted from the camera
and the computer. Continued use outside the lab or circulation of your data is
foreclosed.
With your signature you consent to the possible use of your photography in today’s
experiment.
In case you refuse the possible use of your picture you cannot participate in today’s
experiment. Yet you still receive the participation fee of 4 euros.
Comprehension test
Question A1. A group consists of exactly 5 group members (Yes/No).
Question A2. The composition of the group changes during the experiment
(Yes/No).
Question A3. Your decisions remain anonymous (Yes/No (correct in the dis-
closure treatments)).
Question A4. All group members receive the same return from the public good
(Yes/No).
Question B. What is your income if you invest 20 ECU and the four other
group members invest in sum 120 ECU into the public venture?
Question C. What is your income if you invest 30 ECU and the four other
group members invest in sum 60 ECU into the public venture?
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Trust in Government: Determinants and
Ties to Economic Growth
4.1 Introduction
Institutions and governments which implement and execute laws and policies, pro-
tect property rights and warrant an independent justice system as well as a level
playing field for citizens and businesses, are regarded as crucial for economic devel-
opment (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 2016; LaPorta et
al., 1999; Rodrik et al., 2004). Indeed, countries with high-quality institutions are
much more successful in collecting revenues to provide public goods and services,
and in investing in their rule of law to discourage self-interest, corruption, and
free riding (Besley and Persson, 2013). Without efficient and reliable institutions,
high transaction costs in economic exchanges harm growth and exacerbate public
good production, making protection of property rights expensive (North, 1990,
1998; Olson, 1996).
Another widely shared view in all disciplines of the social sciences is that the more
reliable and efficient institutions are, the trustworthier they appear, and the more
trust economic agents consequentially put in these institutions. Yet, cultural and
economic factors as well as social norms have a considerable influence on trust,
and the extent of trust in government varies markedly between countries. In a
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worldwide comparison, the puzzling finding of an inverse relationship between
trust in government and institutional quality (see Figure 4.1 in Section 4.4) sets
out the first central research objective in this paper: focusing on different regime
types (democracies vs. autocratically ruled countries) and how they approach
citizens, a number of potential contributors – ranging from government control
over the flow of information and fear of retaliation to corruption, pluralism, and
political cultures – for this (seemingly) paradoxical relationship will be analyzed.
Besides being an indicator for institutional quality, the OECD (2017) sees trust
in government also as a driver of economic development, in particular by “stimu-
lating investment and consumption” (p. 214). Until now, however, this claim on
the connection between trust and economic growth lacks empirical evidence. The
second central research objective is thus to explore both direct and indirect reper-
cussions of confidence in government on countries’ economic development. The
direct link might be at work when citizens, based on shared norms and values,
believe that the government pursues policies which are beneficial and important
for the people.1 If citizens feel confident about the government’s motives, they
might even support policies that lead to (short-term) detriments, or involve viola-
tions of accountability and property rights. As argued by the OECD (2017), trust
in the reliability and efficiency of institutions might positively affect the over-
all economic climate (e.g. investments, fiscal capacity, or consumption), which
subsequently leads to increased growth rates.
For a sample of up to 68 economies worldwide in the time period 1980-2010, a
2SLS estimator is modeled to explore the direct link between trust and growth.
Within the 2SLS approach, trust in government is instrumented by predetermined
between-country differences in the political system and cultural aspects. The 3SLS
approach is used to estimate potential indirect effects: a country’s growth rate is
regressed on the proposed growth-intermediaries, which have been predicted by
the (instrumented) trust in government.
The analysis in this article finds three main results: first, high trust in government
and an arguably uncritical attitude towards authorities is influenced by the polit-
1See, for example, Gangl et al. (2012) and their elucidations on trust in authorities and its
interplay with the “power” authorities exert on citizens.
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ical system, that is, whether a country is a democracy or an autocracy. Possible
explanations provided in this paper are the potential fear of (openly) criticizing
leaders of an oppressive regime, but also deeply rooted pro-state, nationalistic or
collectivist norms propagated for decades. Rothstein (2000) describes “different
cultures of trust around the world” (p. 486) and argues that trust would build
on information about moral standards (in the society), professional norms, and
the government’s trust-history. Indeed, government-controlled or biased media are
strongly positively associated with trust. Second, when the regime type and other
cultural noneconomic forces are accounted for, trust in government can have a di-
rect positive effect on economic development, although its magnitude is negligible.
Third, this paper does not find indirect growth-enhancing effects of confidence in
government via increased investments, consumption, or tax revenues. Trust in
government does not seem to translate into social trust (see Section 4.3 for a
review and discussion on social trust and its links to trust in government) with-
out functioning institutions that warrant economic equality and opportunities,
personal freedoms, and equality before the law.
4.2 A brief definition of trust in government
Going beyond a standard-economic, game theoretic view of trust as an agent A
being sufficiently confident that B has no incentive to engage in an action X to the
detriment of A, Levi (1998) describes trust as an umbrella term for a “variety of
phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with others” to “solve
collective action problems” (p. 1). Transferring her description to the institutional
level, Levi (1998) defines government trustworthiness as “procedures for selecting
and constraining the agents of institutions so that they are competent, credible,
and likely to act in the interests of those being asked to trust the institution” (p.
3). Levi further emphasizes that trust per se is (normatively) neither good nor
bad, because it would not be necessarily beneficial for an individual or the society
as a whole.
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For the USA and Europe, studies find a steady decline in trust in government
in the past decades. Frequently reported reasons are worries about the economy
and social decline, crime, political scandals, and perceived increases in corruption
and deceit (Chanley et al., 2000; Dalton, 2005; Pew, 2015; OECD, 2017). As
Dalton (2005) reports for advanced industrialized economies, the better educated
are more likely to distrust the government.
Complementing Rothstein’s (2000) notions on the connection of trust to culture
and norms, Citrin (1974) commented on the declining trust in the USA as “a cur-
rent zeitgeist, which legitimizes, even encourages, the expression of anti-political
rhetorics” that “makes it fashionable to demigrate politicians and to criticize es-
tablished institutions” (p. 975).2
In the present article, trust in government is measured with an item from the
World Values Survey (WVS, waves 2 (1990-1994) to 6 (2010-2014)) polling for
the level of “confidence in the national government”, which respondents could
assess on an ordinal scale from 1(=none at all) to 4(=a great deal). The individ-
ual responses on trust in government are aggregated by calculating the share of
persons whose trust is 1, ..., 4 per country. In this paper, having confidence in gov-
ernment is defined as the share of surveyed individuals responding with 3(=quite
a lot) or 4(=a great deal) of confidence. This definition of trust is chosen to allow
for some skepticism towards the government (“quite a lot”), but not to an extent
where hesitation (answer category 2=not very much confidence) might outweigh
trust. Some countries were surveyed in two or more waves. In this case, the mean
shares over the 2+ waves were calculated. Throughout the analysis, the quality
of institutions is measured by the World Governance Indicator (WGI) “Rule of
law” (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Zero-centered, the indicator evaluates the strength
of the rule of law based on a large array of sub-indices.3
2While trust in government in the industrialized Western economies is comparably low, a positive
correlation with institutional quality is found (r = .58, p < .001). The reverse is the case in
former Soviet Republics, where especially Central Asian autocracies drive this association with
high values for trust in government and low measures for institutional quality. The correlations
hold when conditioned on average per capita GDP.
3The “Rule of law” estimates can range from -2.5 to +2.5 (greater values imply better gover-
nance) and are updated on a yearly basis, starting in 1996. In this paper, the average point
estimate in the time period 1996-2010 is calculated for all countries in the sample.
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4.3 Trust in government and social trust
Rothstein, in his 2000 paper “Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories”,
argues in favor of a mechanism where trust in society begins with trustworthy
institutions and trust, in a manner of speaking, trickles down to the interpersonal
level, creating social trust and facilitating the production of social capital in a
society. The theory of social capital took off with the influential book Making
democracy work by Putnam (1993), in which he defined social capital as “features
of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p.167). Putnam argued
that such differences in cooperativeness, shared norms or values would explain
long-term growth differences between the northern parts of the country and the
economically less developed Southern Italy.
Putnam’s definition can in principle be transferred to the government as a specific
(formal) agency that plans and coordinates policies, rules, and behavioral as well
as legal norms. Relating to Rothstein (2000), authorities, with their actions and
appearance, will likely set the ground and the guiding principles for the develop-
ment of social trust. Rothstein describes this precept by recounting a chat with
a Russian tax official, who argued that tax evasion in Russia was rampant not
because taxpayers did not want to comply, but because they, firstly, did not trust
the corrupt bureaucracy to use the revenues for beneficial causes and, secondly,
they did not trust the government’s ability to thwart others’ tax evasion. Thus, a
lack of trust in government spread out to a lack of interpersonal trust – a classic
social dilemma.
Knack and Keefer (1997) found significant positive associations between social
trust and confidence in government (WVS data); a one percent increase in social
trust correlated to a .5 percentage point increase in trust in government. The au-
thors also found positive associations of increases in social trust with bureaucratic
efficiency, protection of property rights, and the enforceability of contracts.
Arguably, social trust has the advantage (over trust in government) that it is not
directed at a specific institution, especially if it actively aims at influencing citi-
zens’ perceptions, either by threats and oppressive tendencies or by manipulating
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the information reaching the public. When the stated trust in government does not
coincide with the actual perception, lacking social trust (expressed e.g. through
tax evasion or private investments in security) might approximate governments’
deficiencies.4 Yet, inspecting trust in government promises to be worthwhile re-
gardless of whether it is truly felt or not. In the former case, policy decisions
(even if they violate property rights or equity concerns) might be supported with
admiration. In the latter case they might not be endorsed, but also not questioned
or opposed.5
For social trust, several influential studies have analyzed its ties to economic
growth: Knack and Keefer (1997), in their seminal cross-country study, find a
significant positive correlation between interpersonal trust, civic norms, and eco-
nomic activity. Zak and Knack (2001), in their cross-country analysis, find that
a low-trust environment reduces investments, and is connected to a large social
distance between agents and to weak institutions, adversely impacting economic
growth. Bjørnskov (2012) aimed at establishing causal links between social trust
and growth with a 3SLS approach. Instrumenting trust with exogenous noneco-
nomic forces, he finds that trust directly affects schooling decisions and the quality
of institutions, which in turn raised growth rates and gross investments.
Attention has also been directed at the determinants of social capital. Bjørnskov
(2006) finds that only social trust, but not social norms or associational activities
are underlying the positive effects on governance and life satisfaction. Rothstein
and Stolle (2003) asked why social capital has been particularly high in Scandi-
navia (compared to e.g. the USA) and find high economic equality, low levels
of patronage and corruption, and non-discriminatory welfare programs as impor-
tant contributors. Bjørnskov (2007), in a cross-country study, identifies income
inequality, ethnic diversity, and living in a post-communist country as negative
4Trust in government within countries is also more volatile and responsive to political and
economic shocks than social trust, which is found to be quite stable over time (Uslaner, 2002,
2008; Tabellini, 2008). Comparing different countries at different points of time becomes an
issue, which is not eradicated, but alleviated by including regional dummies and additionally
WVS wave dummies as a robustness check in the empirical analysis (Section 4.8).
5Fitting examples are infrastructure projects like dams or highways built directly through res-
idential areas. Such projects are profitable investments, a fortiori if the government is not
forced to ask for permission, does not need to fear lawsuits, or can react with expropriations
and violence to sparking resistance.
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determinants of social trust, while protestantism and living in a monarchy – a
symbol of political stability and unity – enhanced social cohesion. Alesina and
LaFerrara (2002) used individual level data from US localities on interpersonal
trust and find that it was reduced by recent traumatic experiences, perceived
discrimination, low education, and by low income.
4.4 Trust in government and the political sys-
tem
Panel (A) of Figure 4.1 plots a quadratic fit of the average per capita GDP growth
in the period 1980-2010 against the World Governance Indicator “Rule of Law”.6
The plot shows that growth initially steadily increases with better institutional
quality. Only for those countries with the strongest rule of law, growth is predicted
to decrease.
Figure 4.1: Growth, trust, and the quality of institutions.
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A straightforward explanation for this picture is that those countries with the
highest institutional quality are predominantly also the most developed economies,
with the historically longest periods of strong and steady economic growth. At this
point, a certain saturation occurs, and average growth rates decline. Panel (B)
of Figure 4.1 shows the negative relationship (quadratically fitted data) between
6Data for GDP and GDP growth are retrieved from the Penn World Tables, release 9. Table A4.1
in the Appendix gives an overview over all data (and their source) used in this paper.
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trust in government and institutional quality in the years 1980-2010; the corre-
lation is only moderate, but in stark contrast to the strong positive association
between social trust and the quality of institutions (see Section 4.3).
High-quality institutions are not only positively associated with economic devel-
opment, but also highly correlated with per capita GDP (r = .8, p < .001); the
poorer a country, the worse its rule of law. Figure 4.2 plots countries according to
their trust in government and their average per capita GDP between 1980-2010.
Those countries with the highest confidence in government are predominantly
transitioning or developing economies, whose institutions do not live up to the
standard of trustworthiness defined above. The proposed positive relationship
between trust and GDP (institutional quality) exists only for OECD countries,
for example when comparing Eastern European to Southern European states, and
the latter to the Scandinavian countries in this sample.
Figure 4.2: Per capita GDP and trust in government
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The associations found in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 can be largely attributed to the
political system, i.e., whether a country is governed democratically or ruled by
an autocratic regime. In the latter group, around 54% of the population have
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“quite a lot” or even “a great deal” of confidence in their government. This
tops trust in democracies by around 15 percentage points (p <.001, two-sided t-
test). This disparity upends what one could expect: people trust their government
if it behaves trustworthy, i.e., if institutional qualities are well-developed. In
fact, the difference in trust in government is driven by stating maximum (thus,
practically unconditional) confidence in government. Across all WVS waves, 21%
of respondents in autocracies stated “a great deal” of confidence, opposed to only
7% in democracies (p <.001, two-sided t-test).
Living in an autocratically ruled country and trust in government are positively
correlated (r=.4, p <.001), which is in opposition to generalized trust (r= -.18,
p=.09).7 Compared to confidence in government, the differences between democ-
racies and autocracies are smaller (28% vs. 23%), with citizens in democracies
slightly more trusting (p=.09, two-sided t-test).
Table 4.1: Trust and economic growth by geo-political region
Region Trust (%) Trust (range) Autocracy
(share)
Growth
rate
(%)
South- and South-East Asia 61.1 28.9 - 98.1 77% 3.77
Sub-Saharan Africa 56.4 29.6 - 82.9 91% 1.27
Middle East and Northern Africa 50.8 19.5 - 83.3 87% 1.20
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 43.1 15.2 - 97.1 58% 1.92
Western countries* 38.9 26.4 - 61.9 0 1.62
Latin America 38.5 12.7 - 54.2 25% 1.21
* Western countries include European countries which have never been Socialist and/or allied
with the Soviet Union, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
In Table 4.1, 92 countries (with data for trust in government) are grouped into
six geo-political regions and sorted according to the share of respondents stating
trust in their government. Trust is highest in South(-east) and Southern Asia,
followed by Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Again, this upends scores
in institutional quality as well as per capita GDP. The range of trust in govern-
ment across countries is very large, and top values are reached exclusively in closed
7In the WVS, generalized trust is a binary choice (“Most people can be trusted” vs. “Need to
be very careful”). Here, responses were aggregated per country (and across waves), returning
a share between 0 and 100.
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autocracies. In Western countries, confidence in government is highest in the Scan-
dinavian countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden). With a low share of autocratically
ruled countries (Western economies, Latin America), trust in government drops
significantly.
The connection to economic growth is less obvious. South- and South-Eastern
Asian countries experienced on average far higher growth in the period 1980-
2010 than the other geo-political regions. The Middle East and Sub-Saharan
Africa experienced less growth than European countries, closely resembling Latin
America in this respect. Using simple statistical tests, differences in growth rates
across countries are found to be statistically insignificant. Democratic countries
are wealthier, incomes are distributed more equally, and per capita consumption
as well as gross investment rates are higher.
The different demeanor of autocratic versus democratic governments is expressed
in control over the media and the public opinion, the occurrence of corruption,
and the protection of civil and personal rights and freedoms. The rich Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) database (V-Dem, 2018), which aims to measure and con-
ceptualize democracy as a multidimensional and complex system of rule, collates
a wide array of indicators on the quality of government for all countries of the
world. The V-Dem measures used in this paper are either indices running from
0-1, or reflect expert opinions on an ordinal scale. Most measures are available
on a yearly basis. In this study, an average value for the time period 1980-2010 is
calculated for each country.
Especially government censorship of the media is found to be important for respon-
dents’ trust in government. With such practices, information about misbehavior
or shortcomings will seldom reach the public. On the contrary, the media might
turn towards a pro-government propaganda. Correlating trust in government with
an array of V-Dem indicators on censorship efforts and biases of the media (see
Table A4.3 in the Appendix) returns highly significant Pearson-correlations in
the range from about -.4 to -.45. Because higher values indicate more freedom,
trust in government declines with a more pluralistic press. Unsurprisingly, liberty
of the press heavily depends on the regime type. Correlating V-Dem measures
on bribery and corruption in the public sector with trust in government returns
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insignificant coefficients. Again, the richer a country in economic terms, the less
corruption occurs. As for media freedoms, there is no noticeable correlation with
economic growth.
The V-Dem dataset also features a variety of indices on the quality of democ-
racy and the protection of pluralistic societies (e.g. achieving ideals of democracy,
freedom of expression and religion, see Table A4.3). For all items, the familiar
result is that autocracies and less developed countries score worse than democ-
racies, and that the indices are (consequentially) negatively correlated with trust
in government. Pearson-correlations lie in the range of -.3 to -.4 and are highly
significant.
Within the four categories, the V-Dem indicators are highly correlated. With a
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), scores for media freedom, corrupt activi-
ties, the quality of democracy, and protection of personal freedoms are calculated
(see Table A4.4 in the Appendix). Predicted scores for the first principal compo-
nent in each of the four categories (Eigenvalue >1) are then transformed to an
index running from 0(worst) to 100(best) and regressed on the dependent variable
trust in government, also controlling for average per capita GDP.
Table 4.2: Determinants of trust in government, conditional corre-
lations
Free media No corruption Democracy Pers. freedoms GDP p.c.
trust -.386** .233* -.278 .114 .0
(.151) (.102) (.150) (.145) (.0)
N = 92, R2 = .327, Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1, **p < .05
The result of this simple conditional correlation is shown in Table 4.2. Independent
and critical media have a negative association with trust in government, while
less corruption is associated with more trust. A better achievement of democratic
ideals (Table A4.3) is negatively correlated with trust in government, but just
misses statistical significance. A better protection of personal freedoms returns a
positive coefficient, but the standard error is very large. Per capita GDP has no
connection to trust in government.
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4.5 Determinants of trust in government
The four components used in Table 4.2 must be considered as endogenous to trust
in government; government-control over the media is one example: a government
might censor the freedom of expression because it is aware that its approach to-
wards the citizens is not an objectively trustworthy one. Perhaps, the government
distrusts the people and fears open opposition and resistance. Regarding corrup-
tion, a reciprocal relationship will be at work as well. Recall Rothstein (2000) and
his recount of the conversation with the Russian government official, who argued
that tax officers wanted to be honest, but did not comply because they figured
that their colleagues and the taxpayers were not either.
However, corruption, oppression, censorship, or violence can all be considered as
outcome measures of undemocratic regimes that base policies not on a rule of law,
but rather on a strict policy doctrine (Rothstein, 2015). Considering the countries
analyzed in this paper, the decision whether a country became a democracy or
not dates back (at least) decades prior to the time period studied in this paper.8
The earliest possible observation for trust in government comes from 1990. At
this point, subjective assessments of trust had been exposed and shaped by the
political system and its appearance for years.
This long-term exposure gives the regime type (as a determinant of between-
country differences in trust) exogeneity in this specific sense. Other potential de-
terminants of trust in government are noneconomic cultural forces, approximated
here by the average share of Muslims and Catholics residing in a country. These
influences have also been predetermined well prior to the period studied in this
article, and rest on the findings by Berggren and Jordahl (2006) and Bjørnskov
(2007) that hierarchical religions are generally associated with less trust. Finally,
countries’ legal origins (LaPorta et al., 1999) are included as an additional instru-
ment to acknowledge potential persistent differences in the structure and quality
of institutions. The instruments and the 2SLS/3SLS approach are used to tackle
8The exceptions are the former Soviet and Yugoslavian republics in Europe and Central Asia
who gained their independence not before 1991. In the empirical analysis these countries are
dropped from the sample.
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reverse causality and simultaneity issues as far as it is feasible at all in a simple
cross-country context.9
Table 4.3 presents the first stage results of the 2SLS approach to test the direct
ties of trust in government and economic growth (see Table 4.4 in Section 4.6).
The instruments in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.3 are the Autocracy dummy,
which takes the value 1 if a country is classified as an electoral or as a closed
autocracy10, and the share of Muslims and Catholics in a country (CIA, 2018). In
column (2) (and later in column (3)), a reduced sample is used: observations drop
out when some covariates, especially growth rates of per-capita GDP in 1980,
were not available.
Table 4.3: First-stage regressions for trust in government
Trust in gov. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autocracy 10.91∗∗ 13.65∗∗∗ 14.90∗∗∗ 7.732∗∗ 9.837∗∗ 10.80∗∗∗
(4.198) (4.725) (4.669) (3.748) (4.191) (3.907)
Communism 54.44∗∗∗ 51.18∗∗∗ 59.73∗∗∗
(3.357) (3.686) (5.630)
Muslim share 0.036 −0.037 −0.009 0.087 0.029 0.095
(0.070) (0.077) (0.116) (0.062) (0.067) (0.092)
Catholic share −0.098∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.118 −0.073 −0.138∗∗ −0.022
(0.054) (0.062) (0.124) (0.053) (0.059) (0.101)
Legal origin, UK is the base category
French −4.306 −9.713
(7.740) (6.592)
German −3.805 −9.307∗
(6.806) (5.002)
Scandinavian 6.866 7.405
(5.199) (4.971)
Observations 91 68 68 91 68 68
F -statistic 7.264 8.387 5.265 112.0 92.17 53.46
Adj. R2 0.159 0.238 0.217 0.277 0.361 0.387
Notes: OLS regressions. In specifications (2), (3), (5), and (6) observations are excluded when no estimate for
per capita GDP in 1980 was available. This applies first and foremost to former Soviet and former Yugoslavian
states. When the Communism dummy is included (China and Vietnam), the two countries are not included in
the Autocracy dummy. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
The results confirm the finding that living in a repressive political system (with
the side effects of being poorer and being confronted with worse institutions) is
9The rationale behind the choice of the instruments, and the 2SLS/3SLS approach to estimate
effects of trust on growth are related to Bjørnskov (2012), who used social trust as the variable
of interest.
10Regimes of the World (RoW) measure, retrieved from the V-Dem dataset.
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associated with significantly more trust in the authorities of the political system.
A larger share of Muslims has no influence on trust, while Catholics tend to
distrust the government, although the effect size is small. Column (3) uses the
legal origin of a country (with the Anglo-American Common Law as the reference
category) as an additional instrument. The legal origin is found to be insignificant
and does not improve the explanatory power of the model.
Columns (4), (5) and (6) introduce an additional dummy for officially Marxist-
Leninist countries, here namely China and Vietnam. This ideology is particularly
pro-government, with a distinctive cult build around leaders, a dominant public
sector (with de-facto state ownership of industry and resources), and the state as
the central coordinator of the economy, culture, and norms – essentially everyday
life. The results show that in China and Vietnam trust in government is well above
50 percentage points higher than in other countries, including other autocracies.
In the remaining autocracies (now excluding China and Vietnam), trust in govern-
ment is still significantly higher than in democracies, but the effect size is smaller
compared to columns (1), (2) and (3). The multiplied F -statistics and also the
increased R2 point to the importance of long-term state-glorifying norms, oppres-
sive policies, and media bias for subjective trust in government. The effects of
religious denomination and legal origins remain negligible in magnitude and are
mostly statistically insignificant.
4.6 The direct effect of trust on growth
Figure 4.3 suggests a positive correlation in the time period 1980-2010. Panel (A)
shows that the majority of advanced economies had moderate per capita GDP
growth rates (between 1% and 2%). The positive slope of the quadratic fit in
Panel (B) of Figure 4.3 is in large parts driven by dynamic emerging economies in
Southern- and South-East Asia. In particular China and Vietnam, two officially
Communist states, have both the highest average growth rate and the highest
subjective trust in government.
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Figure 4.3: GDP growth and trust in government
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Table 4.4 presents the second-stage regressions of the 2SLS model, estimating the
effect of the instrumented Trust in government on the average GDP growth rate.
The latter is calculated in a standard Barro-type way as the difference between
the logs to per capita GDP in 2010 and 1980, divided by 30. All GDP data were
retrieved from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al., 2015).
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Models (1)-(3) of Table 4.4 use only the Autocracy dummy as the regime-type
instrument in the first stage, models (4)-(6) differentiate between autocracies and
the two Communist countries in the sample. Furthermore, in columns (1) and
(4), the legal origins are used as additional instruments in the first stage (see
Table 4.3). All models in Table 4.4 use the log of per capita GDP in 1980 (losing
observations of countries which were not sovereign in that year), the average
fertility rate, and the average openness to trade as covariates (see Table A4.1 for
descriptions). Regional effects are included in all specifications, with South- and
(South-)East Asia as the reference region.
Table 4.4: Second-stage regressions for GDP growth rate
Growth Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust in gov. 0.021 0.016 0.011 0.024∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
log GDP (1980) −0.903∗∗∗ −0.905∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.901∗∗∗ −0.901∗∗∗ −0.933∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.159) (0.174) (0.166) (0.166) (0.183)
Fertility −0.863∗∗∗ −0.851∗∗∗ −0.658∗∗∗ −0.870∗∗∗ −0.871∗∗∗ −0.706∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.193) (0.162) (0.182) (0.184) (0.152)
Openness −0 0 −0 −0 −0 −0
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Investment rate 0.041 0.033
(0.031) (0.032)
Rule of law 0.396∗∗ 0.363∗
(0.194) (0.203)
Regional effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62
F -statistic 14.32 15.22 17.07 17.31 16.67 20.88
Hansen J-stat., p < 0.411 0.124 0.665 0.537 0.197 0.755
Adj. R2 0.622 0.640 0.682 0.609 0.607 0.638
1st stage F -stat. 3.48 3.41 2.65 12.99 18.36 14.31
Partial 1st stage R2 0.139 0.111 0.120 0.347 0.331 0.364
Notes: 2SLS regressions, second stage results are reported. Specifications (4)-(6) use the Autocracy and the
Communism dummies, specifications (1)-(3) use only the Autocracy dummy (including China and Vietnam)
as an instrument. Besides the share of Muslims and Catholics in a country, specifications (1) and (4) use the
countries’ legal origin as an additional instrument. For the different geo-political regions, see Table 4.1. South-
and east Asia is the reference category. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ :
p < 0.01.
Throughout all models of Table 4.4, the effect size of trust in government is fairly
small; a one-percentage point increase in trust is predicted to raise economic
growth by around .02%. When only the Autocracy dummy is used as an instru-
ment for trust in government (columns (1)-(3)), the effect is not significant. This
changes when including the Communist dummy gives the first-stage regressions
more power, evident in the multiplied 1st stage F -statistic and the markedly in-
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creased partial first-stage R2. All models in Table 4.4 pass Hansen’s J-test for
overidentification, meaning that the instruments used in the first stage can be
considered as exogenous (given that at least one of the instruments is truly ex-
ogenous). The coefficients for log GDP in 1980 and the fertility rate are highly
significant and of the expected sign, while a higher openness to trade has no direct
connection to economic growth in the specifications used in Table 4.4.
In columns (3) and (6) of Table 4.4, a country’s average gross investment rate
and the Rule of Law index are included as additional potential determinants of
economic growth. While no effect is found for investments, higher institutional
quality is significantly positively associated with economic development.
4.7 Indirect effects of trust on growth
Table 4.5 presents 2SLS estimations for the effect of trust on three measures which
potentially affect economic growth: trust in the accountability and fairness of
institutions might trigger investments by individuals or companies, subsequently
facilitating growth. More trust in government might also lead to increased work in
the official sector. Thus, the economy could grow by higher taxable activities, and
also through less tax non-compliance. Lastly, as stated in OECD (2017), higher
trust in government could stimulate consumption, leading to increased demand,
and could support production and economic development.
In columns (1)-(3) of Table 4.5, the Autocracy dummy, together with the share
of Muslims and Catholics and the countries’ legal origin, are used as instruments.
In columns (4)-(6), the Communism dummy is included as an additional in-
strument (see Table 4.3). The results indicate that trust in government has no
significant impact on any of the three tested growth intermediaries. For social
trust, Bjørnskov (2012), with a comparable 2SLS approach, finds positive effects
of higher social capital on the rule of law and schooling, but also finds no effect
on gross investments.11
11Testing the effect of trust on the Rule of Law in the 2SLS setting leads to a weak-instrument
problem, because the political system as well as legal origins do not only determine trust
but also the World Bank’s governance indicators. The human capital index provided in the
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Table 4.5: Second-stage regressions for growth intermediaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment rateTax RevenuesConsumptionInvestment RateTax Revenues Consumption
Trust in gov. 0.079 −0.092 −68.39 −0 −0.073 −37.81
(0.063) (0.105) (52.60) (0.049) (0.068) (43.05)
log GDP (1980) 0.413 −0.971 4454.0∗∗∗ 0.329 −0.991 4486.5∗∗∗
(0.693) (1.315) (604.7) (0.677) (1.308) (573.2)
Openness 0.012 −0.003 8.450 0.022∗∗ −0 4.816
(0.013) (0.023) (9.353) (0.010) (0.019) (8.970)
Size of gov. −0.172∗∗ 0.367∗∗ 3.811 −0.186∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗ 9.543
(0.075) (0.152) (64.41) (0.068) (0.157) (59.66)
Regional effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
F -statistic 9.42 4.64 48.03 12.70 5.21 50.46
Hansen J-stat., p < 0.315 0.532 0.120 0.147 0.578 0.127
Adj. R2 0.337 0.254 0.871 0.502 0.272 0.902
1st stage F -stat. 3.87 3.87 3.87 9.94 9.94 9.94
Partial 1st stage R2 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.285 0.285 0.285
Notes: 2SLS regressions, second stage results are reported. Specifications (4)-(6) use the Autocracy and the
Communism dummies, specifications (1)-(3) use only the Autocracy dummy (including China and Vietnam) as
an instrument. The other instruments are the shares of Catholics and Muslim in a country and the legal origin
of a country. For the different geo-political regions, see Table 4.1. South- and east Asia is the reference category.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p < 0.01.
A more active and involved government (measured by the government expendi-
tures as a share of GDP) has a significant negative effect on gross investments,
and a positive effect on tax revenues across countries. All models in Table 4.5 pass
the Sargan-Hansen J-test, first stage R2 and F statistics are reported as well.
Table 4.6 shows the results from the 3SLS approach, regressing the average GDP
growth rate on the estimated coefficients (see Table 4.5) of investment rate, per
capita consumption, and in two specifications additionally on tax revenues (as a
share of GDP). Columns (1) and (2) use only the Autocracy dummy (alongside
the legal origin and the shares of Muslims and Catholics in a country) as instru-
ments for trust in government in the first stage, columns (3) and (4) use both the
Autocracy and the Communism dummy. When tax revenues are not included
in the 3SLS estimation, countries with higher gross investments per capita (as a
share of GDP) are predicted to experience higher growth, while increased con-
Penn World Tables and the share of the population with secondary or tertiary education were
tested as a schooling-measure. While the latter and the human capital index are moderately
correlated to trust in government, they have (in this sample) no connection to economic
growth. Using the schooling measures returned no significant result in both the 2SLS and
3SLS setting (not reported in Tables).
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sumption has no effect. When tax revenues are included, they are significantly
positively associated with growth.
Table 4.6: Trust intermediaries and economic growth, 3SLS results
Growth rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
log GDP (1980) −0.850∗ −1.058∗∗∗ 0.759∗ −0.989∗∗∗
(0.447) (0.430) (0.443) (0.427)
Openness −0 0.001 −0 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Fertility −0.507∗∗∗ −0.600∗∗∗ −0.497∗∗∗ −0.595∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.171) (0.191) (0.170)
Investment rate 0.136∗∗ 0.089∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.077
(0.053) (0.049) (0.051) (0.048)
Tax revenues 0.078∗ 0.083∗∗
(0.043) (0.042)
Consumption 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Regional effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 57 57 57 57
R2 0.459 0.633 0.448 0.644
χ2 110.32 112.87 110.06 111.72
Notes: 3SLS regressions, third stage results are reported. Specifications (3) and(4) use
the Autocracy and the Communism dummies, specifications (1)and (2) use only the
Autocracy dummy (including China and Vietnam) as an instrument. The other instru-
ments are the shares of Catholics and Muslim in a country and the legal origin of a country.
For the different geo-political regions, see Table 4.1. South- and east Asia is the reference
category. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ : p < 0.1; ,∗∗ : p < 0.05;∗∗∗ : p <
0.01.
4.8 Robustness checks
The trust-growth link. An open question is the long-term consequence of the
trust-growth link. The most-developed economies, which experienced the longest
periods of economic growth, have also the “best” institutions, and the established
point of view is that growth and the differences in countries’ wealth is caused
by persistent discrepancies in institutional quality. Glaeser et al. (2004) provide
a rare exception to this prevailing view. Revisiting literature on the causal link
between institutions and growth, they claim to find severe conceptual flaws and
argue in favor of a reverse mechanism: poor countries can escape poverty by good
policies, often introduced by autocratic leaders.
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Table 4.7: Conditional correlations
Panel A: Connections of growth rate and trust in government
Growth
rate
Autocracy Communism Muslim
share
Catholic
share
Legal ori-
gin
F -
statistic
R2
(1) trust 1.997 14.60*** 0.015 -0.079 Yes 4.35 0.306
(1.855) (4.298) (.110) (0.124)
(2) trust -0.242 10.777*** 60.445*** 0.093 -0.025 Yes 47.29 0.451
(1.470) (3.978) 5.927 (.094) (0.109)
Panel B: Connections of growth rate and institutional quality
Growth
rate
Autocracy Communism Muslim
share
Catholic
share
Legal ori-
gin
F -
statistic
R2
(1) Rule of law 0.014 -1.121*** -0.004 -0.011** Yes 75.36 0.514
(0.082) (0.231) (0.003) (0.004)
(2) Rule of law 0.058 -1.042*** -1.992*** -0.005 -0.012*** Yes 85.00 0.534
(0.091) (0.232) (0.421) (0.003) (0.004)
Panel C: Connections of institutional quality and economic growth
Rule of
law
log GDP
(1980)
Openness Fertility Investment
rate
Regional
effects
F -
statistic
R2
(1) Growth rate 0.435** -0.941*** -0.0 -0.588*** 0.046 Yes 19.97 0.750
(0.210) (0.193) (0.003) (0.140) (0.031)
Note : OLS regressions. “Legal origins” and “Regional effects” are dummy variables, measured
against a reference category. N = 62 in all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01
The data used in the present paper suggests (without claiming to offer an answer to
this debate) that a stricter rule of law is associated with higher growth rates (Panel
C, Table 4.7), while the reverse case (Panel B) shows no significant correlations.12
Panel A of Table 4.7 checks whether higher growth rates (besides the predictors
introduced in Table 4.3) have a positive influence on trust in government. The
results suggest that this is not the case. While higher trust in government can
increase growth rates from a cross-country perspective, the reverse associations
are not significant (p=.778 in model (1), p=.870 in model (2)).
Excluding extreme trust. Figure 4.3 suggests that the positive linkage be-
tween trust in government and economic development is perhaps driven by out-
12In Panel B of Table 4.7, institutional quality is estimated with the same predictors as trust in
government, supplemented by economic growth. For explanations, see Section 4.5. Panel C
uses the same covariates used to predict growth as in sections 4.6 and 4.7.
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liers, especially those countries with very high trust, which mostly also experienced
the strongest GDP growth in the period 1980-2010.
Table 4.8: Excluding extremely high and extremely low trust
Panel A: First-stage regressions
Autocracy Muslim
share
Catholic
share
Legal
origin
N R2
(1) Trust 9.310** 0.108 0.008 Yes 61 0.302
(3.866) (0.091) (0.102)
(2) Trust 5.708 -0.040 -0.129 Yes 53 0.243
(3.489) (0.069) (0.089)
Panel B: Second-stage regressions
Trust log GDP
1980
Fertility Openness N R2
(1) Growth rate 0.053** -0.911*** -0.911*** -0.006 55 0.524
(0.023) (0.246) (0.258) (0.005)
(2) Growth rate 0.036** -0.825*** -0.802*** -0.004 48 0.571
(0.016) (0.212) (0.252) (0.007)
Panel C: Third-stage regressions
log GDP
1980
Openness Fertility Investment
rate
Tax
rev.
Cons. N χ2
(1) Growth rate -0.567 -0.002 -0.441* 0.187** 0.110** 0 52 85.20
(0.460) (0.003) (0.261) (0.075) (0.048) (0.0)
(2) Growth rate -0.421 -0.001 -0.503* 0.106 0.095* 0 45 60.55
(0.494) (0.007) (0.271) (0.073) (0.048) (0.0)
Specifications indicated with the number (1): countries are excluded if trust in government ex-
ceeds a value abover 80% or under 20%. Specifications indicated with the number (2): countries
are excluded if trust in government exceeds a value abover 65% or under 25%. Explanatory
variables in Panel A are used as instruments to estimate the effect of trust in government on
growth in Panel B. Panel C reports the results of the 3SLS approach. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01
Table 4.8 reports first, second, and third stage regressions for a sample where those
countries with trust in government (1) below 20% and above 80% (see Table A4.2)
respectively (2) below 25% and above 65% were excluded. Among these countries
are also China and Vietnam, therefore the Communism dummy will not be used
to instrument trust in government. For the countries in which trust lies between
20% and 80% the Autocracy dummy remains significant, trust in autocracies is
9 percentage points higher than in democracies. In the even more restrictive
categorization in specification (2) of Panel A in Table 4.8, 45% of countries are
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classified as an autocracy, compared to 51% in (1). The Autocracy dummy is
now no longer statistically significant. Concerning the legal origin of a country,
Scandinavian countries are statistically significantly more trusting compared to
the Common Law countries.
The 2SLS results in Panel B show that the direct impact of trust in government on
the GDP growth rate remains significant also after the exclusion of high-trusting
countries. Particularly in model (1) the effect size increases compared to Table 4.4,
albeit on a low level.13 As in Section 4.7, trust in government does neither posi-
tively affect gross investments nor tax revenues or per capita consumption. Yet,
Panel C of Table 4.8 shows a positive influence of the former two (in specification
(1)) on the growth rate.
OECD countries only. Table 4.9 repeats the first- and second stage with the
19 OECD countries covered in the data. Because all countries (including Turkey)
are rated as democracies, the Autocracy dummy cannot longer be used as an
instrument. In Panel A, a larger share of Muslims in a country is associated with
more trust in government. This finding is driven by Turkey; in all other countries
the average size of the Muslim population does not exceed 5%. For the OECD
countries the estimated impact of trust in government on the growth rate is very
similar to the estimate in Table 4.4. Regional effects are not used in Panel B of
Table 4.9 – the OECD itself is treated as a geopolitical interest group. Because of
the low N , a 3SLS model (requiring nearly as many parameters) is not estimated
in Table 4.9.
Controlling for WVS wave-effects. The observations for trust in government
in this paper often originate from different time periods. For example, it happens
that trust in country A in year 1995 is compared to trust in country B in year
2010. To account for this, I ran the first stage regression with dummy variables
for the WVS survey waves 2-6 as further controls for trust in government. The
dummy took a value of 1 for the wave where a respective country was surveyed. In
the first stage, none of the WVS wave controls was statistically significant. In the
13Both specifications pass the Hansen-J test: (1) p=.594, (2) p=.414.
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2SLS and 3SLS regressions coefficient sizes, statistical significance, F -statistics,
and R2 were largely unaffected compared to Tables 4.4 and 4.6.
Table 4.9: OECD countries only
Panel A: First-stage regression
Muslim
share
Catholic
share
Legal
origin
N R2
Trust 0.156* -0.028 Yes 19 0.400
(0.085) (0.108)
Panel B: Second-stage regression
Trust log GDP
1980
Fertility Openness Region
effects
N R2
Growth rate 0.028* -1.660*** -0.907 -0.007 No 18 0.648
(0.014) (0.629) (0.622) (0.007)
The independent variables in Panel A are used as instruments for trust in government in Panel B.
The Hansen-J statistic is 0.150. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Due to the low number
of observations, estimating a 3SLS model is not applicable. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01
4.9 Discussion and concluding remarks
Across countries, trust in government (counter-intuitively) tends to increase as
a government’s trustworthiness (in terms of institutional quality) decreases. The
first central finding in this study was that the political regime and its repercussions
on everyday life in terms of restrictiveness, violence, and manipulation can account
for this divergence. In the most-trusting countries, the media are often heavily
controlled by the government. When reports about failed policies, corrupt officials,
accidents, or caprice are suppressed or censored, or when only good news (real or
fabricated) are disseminated, citizens perhaps have no apparent reason or incentive
to openly distrust their government.
The result that the political system twists the expected positive relationship be-
tween quality of institutions and trust people put in them amends the description
of different trust-cultures spread by political scientists. In autocratic regimes, the
government (or a specific leader) often is the sole setter of the political and soci-
etal agenda. The norm (and rule) is to trust and to not question the leaders, and
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is enforced with retaliation and intimidation. In (liberal) democracies, the reverse
is the case. Encouraged and used to question those in power, trust in government
is in some cases lower than objectively “deserved”, based on its actions.
The media, international organizations (e.g. OECD, 2017) and political scientists
argue that trust in government plays an important role for countries’ economic
development, in particular by stimulating investments, consumption, and tax com-
pliance. Until now, however, these claims have not been empirically analyzed, and
this paper is the first to provide some (albeit not definite) answers.
This study finds that trust in government can have positive direct ties to economic
growth. In the period of 1980-2010, especially dynamic (emerging) economies with
fast-improving living conditions have trusted governments, while in many rich and
saturated economies, skepticism (despite well-working institutions) predominates.
Possible reasons might be the fear of social and economic descent in an increasingly
globalized world, while in emerging economies people rather perceive chances for
advancement. The direct links between trust and economic development might
lie in the lapse of legal hurdles and tedious democratic decision-making processes.
When the government and its decisions are not or cannot be challenged by citizens,
investment decisions (e.g. infrastructure) can be processed quicker and without
considering workplace safety or health concerns, or competitive tendering proce-
dures.
The economic impact of trust on growth is negligible. Perhaps the more insightful
formulation of this result is that trust in institutions – although it might not be
truly felt, deserved, or justified by authorities’ actions – does not harm economic
development. Complementing the finding in this paper, Rothstein (2015) dis-
cussed what he called in the paper’s title the “Chinese Paradox of High Growth
and Low Quality of Government” and argued that the paradox could be solved
when it was accepted that not only the Western model based on the rule of law,
but also a system “marked by high commitment to a specific policy doctrine” (p.
533) can be suitable for effective policy implementations and economic develop-
ment.
Indeed, it is debated whether institutions are sclerotic (in their quality), or, para-
phrasing Glaeser et al. (2004), whether the quality of government will increase
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as a consequence of citizens becoming wealthier, more educated, informed, and
mobile. Rothstein (2015), on the other hand, argues in favor of a third option:
countries like China, Vietnam, or Malaysia might have found a way where in-
creased economic openness combined with socially restrictive governments leads
to economic development without high-quality institutions in a Western sense.
The present paper does not find support for the claim that trust in government
positively impacts economic growth via intermediaries like investments or in-
creased consumption. Following arguments from political sciences, it seems likely
that trust in government does not automatically translate into social trust, which
has found to be of some importance for economic growth (see Section 4.3). Roth-
stein and Uslaner (2005) argue that social trust is caused by authorities that are
able to promote and secure equal opportunities and social cohesion, and are able
to reduce economic inequality. This is the case in developed economies, but rarely
observed in developing or emerging economies.
Trust in government is prone to manipulation and shaped by deeply rooted norms
and policy doctrines. Arguably, social capital is ultimately more important for
a country’s economic development because it represents how well a government
performed in creating a societal environment where equality, security and depend-
ability enabled strangers to trust each other in daily interactions and transactions.
Trust directed at specific powerful institutions can be biased by fear, hatred, or ad-
miration. This relationship between government and citizens should, however, not
be ignored, since connections are often enough quite direct (think about paying
taxes or interactions with the bureaucracy), and the consequences of interactions
important for economic and social outcomes.
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Appendix Chapter 4
Table A4.1: Sources and Descriptions of the data
Variable Source Description
Trust in government World Values Survey
(waves 2-6)
Share of respondents answering with “quite a
lot” or “a great deal” to the question “How
much confidence do you have in your national
government”.
“Rule of Law” index World Governance In-
dicators (World Bank)
Yearly estimates provided since 1996. Val-
ues for a country can range between -2.5 &
+2.5 and are zero-centered (for all countries
per year).
GDP data Penn World Tables, re-
lease 9
Available on a yearly basis, averages for the
period 1980-2010 were calculated. GDP
growth: the difference to log per capita GDP
in 2010 and 1980, divided by 30.
Religious denomination CIA World Factbook
(2018)
Share of population identified as Catholic,
Protestant, Muslim, etc.
Legal origins La Porta et al. (1999) Dummy-coded. Categories are: UK, French,
German, Scandinavian
Fertility rate gapminder.org via V-
Dem, v8
30 year average of the expected mean number
of children born to a woman over her lifetime.
Openness to trade World Bank 30-year average of the sum of imports and ex-
ports of goods and services (as a share of GDP)
Government expenditures World Bank 30-year average of total government expendi-
tures as a share of GDP
Tax revenues World Bank 30-year average of overall tax revenues as a
share of GDP
Investment rate World Bank 30-year average of the gross capital formation
in a country (share of GDP)
Consumption Penn World Tables, re-
lease 9
30-year average of per capita consumption
(share of GDP)
Politico-geographic regions Quality of Government
Standard Dataset via
V-Dem (2018)
dummy-coded, regions features as described in
Table 4.1.
Regime type Regimes of the World
(RoW) measure, via V-
Dem (2018)
Four types: Closed- and electoral autocracy,
electoral- and liberal democracy. In this pa-
per, both autocracy types are combined in the
Autocracy indicator
Note: The V-Dem indicators introduced in Section 4.2 are described separately in Table A4.3.
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Table A4.2: List of countries
Country Trust
(%)
Growth
(%)
Regime
type
Country Trust
(%)
Growth
(%)
Regime
type
Albania 50.68 2.4 EA Libya 26.79 – CA
Algeria 47.21 0.7 CA Lithuania 36.30 – LD
Andorra 33.00 – – Malaysia 74.98 3.3 EA
Azerbaijan 88.46 – EA Mali 70.56 1.8 EA
Argentina 27.92 1.0 ED Mexico 37.96 0.6 EA
Australia 31.84 1.8 LD Moldova 37.49 – ED
Bahrain 72.38 -0.9 CA Montenegro 36.66 – EA
Bangladesh 83.94 2.6 EA Morocco 53.14 2.1 CA
Armenia 40.91 – EA Netherlands 31.74 1.7 LD
Bosnia and Herzeg. 29.53 – EA New Zealand 33.12 1.4 LD
Brazil 43.98 1.0 ED Nigeria 35.60 1.8 EA
Bulgaria 47.44 2.1 EA Norway 60.39 1.9 LD
Belarus 53.23 – EA Pakistan 37.88 2.1 EA
Canada 39.96 1.3 LD Peru 22.28 1.0 ED
Chile 51.42 3.0 ED Philippines 56.14 0.8 EA
China 93.17 6.2 CA Poland 25.66 2.1 ED
Taiwan 47.62 5.2 EA Puerto Rico 49.54 – –
Colombia 43.02 1.6 ED Qatar 83.32 -0.2 CA
Croatia 52.20 – ED Romania 23.12 1.6 EA
Cyprus 52.55 2.9 ED Russia 40.83 – EA
Czech Republic 38.36 – ED Rwanda 63.65 1.0 CA
Dominican Republic 12.69 2.6 ED Serbia 25.64 – EA
Ecuador 50.46 0.7 ED Singapore 79.04 4.2 EA
El Salvador 40.56 1.2 EA Slovakia 40.65 – LD
Ethiopia 29.56 1.3 EA Viet Nam 98.10 4.8 CA
Estonia 52.06 – LD Slovenia 23.83 – LD
Finland 48.30 2.0 LD South Africa 56.32 0.3 ED
France 28.97 1.4 LD Zimbabwe 48.40 0.1 EA
Georgia 41.17 – EA Spain 33.71 1.9 LD
Germany 29.47 1.6 LD Sweden 50.40 1.7 LD
Ghana 64.81 1.3 EA Switzerland 61.87 1.0 LD
Guatemala 36.32 0.3 EA Thailand 45.44 4.4 EA
Hong Kong 57.94 3.7 CA Trinidad and Tob. 31.95 1.8 LD
Hungary 27.21 1.4 ED Tunisia 19.50 2.4 EA
India 52.10 4.2 ED Turkey 50.77 2.5 ED
Indonesia 54.71 3.5 EA Uganda 77.52 2.9 EA
Iran 57.39 1.3 EA Ukraine 35.86 – EA
Iraq 48.11 -0.8 CA Macedonia 15.23 – ED
Italy 26.44 1.3 LD Egypt 54.77 3.4 EA
Japan 28.89 1.8 LD United Kingdom 34.33 1.9 LD
Kazakhstan 74.95 – EA Tanzania 82.86 1.4 EA
Jordan 75.65 0.7 CA United States 34.37 1.8 LD
South Korea 42.27 5.9 ED Burkina Faso 49.11 1.6 EA
Kuwait 63.09 -0.1 CA Uruguay 54.22 1.7 LD
Kyrgyzstan 48.25 – EA Uzbekistan 97.13 – CA
Lebanon 28.00 1.6 EA Venezuela 41.33 -0.2 ED
Latvia 38.32 – LD Yemen 29.79 – EA
Zambia 42.47 0.5 EA
The growth rate is reported as missing when per capita GDP was not available in 1980. Autoc-
racies: no de-facto multiparty elections. CA: closed autocracy; EA: electoral autocracy, de-jure
multiparty elections; ED: electoral democracy; LD: liberal democracy, rule of law and liberal
principles fully satisfied.
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Table A4.3: V-Dem democracy indicators
Indicator name Type Mean
(democ-
racy)
Mean
(autoc-
racy)
Correlation
with trust
Government control over media and media bias
Media censorship efforts EO (0-4) 3.16 1.48 -.395***
Internet censorship efforts EO (1-4) 2.88 2.28 -.375***
Independent & critical press EO (0-3) 2.54 1.60 -.438***
Pluralistic media EO (0-3) 2.58 1.52 -.459***
Pro-government bias EO (0-4) 2.35 1.39 -.426***
Self-censorship EO (0-3) 3.35 1.97 -.463***
Corrupt activities
Bribery on executive level EO (0-4) 2.67 1.45 -.151
Corruption (public sector) EO (0-4) 2.65 1.43 -.126
Rent-seeking (public sector) EO(0-4) 3.03 1.75 -.144
Gov. working for the common good EO (0-4) 3.06 2.60 -.135
Clientelism IX .73 .45 -.019
Ideals of democracy
Electoral democracy IX .75 .32 -.433***
Liberal democracy IX .65 .21 -.376***
Participatory democracy IX .52 .17 -.405***
Egalitarian democracy IX .62 .24 -.367***
Clean elections IX .83 .34 -.327***
Quality and protection of personal rights and freedoms
Equality before the law IX .86 .55 -.299***
Freedom of academic expression EO (0-4) 3.22 2.00 -.424***
Freedom of speech EO IX .85 .49 -.431***
Freedom of religion EO (0-4) 3.61 2.70 -.303***
No political killings EO (0-4) 3.36 2.34 -.112
All indicators are 30-year averages of the period 1980-2010. EO: expert opinion,
IX: index, running from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate better achievement of media
freedom, accountability, democratic ideals and the protection of rights and freedoms.
The numbers in parentheses indicate the range. ***: p < .01.
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Table A4.4: Principal Component Analysis (V-Dem)
Indicator name Loading Unexplained
Government control over media and media bias
Media censorship efforts .416 .103
Internet censorship efforts .358 .338
Independent & critical press .421 .079
Pluralistic media .419 .089
Pro-government bias .413 .116
Self-censorship .419 .089
Eigenvalue = 5.186; ρ = .864
Corrupt activities
Bribery on executive level .474 .133
Corruption (public sector) .484 .097
Rent-seeking (public sector) .476 .127
Gov. working for the common good .332 .574
Clientelism .452 .211
Eigenvalue = 3.857; ρ = .771
Ideals of democracy
Electoral democracy .451 .024
Liberal democracy .453 .017
Participatory democracy .448 .036
Egalitarian democracy .446 .045
Clean elections .437 .083
Eigenvalue = 4.794; ρ = .959
Quality and protection of personal rights and freedoms
Equality before the law .475 .078
Freedom of academic expression .466 .115
Freedom of speech .473 .088
Freedom of religion .422 .274
No political killings .395 .362
Eigenvalue = 4.083; ρ = .817
Unexplained is the variance (in %) left unexplained by the first principal component.
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